Handelskonflikten mellan USA och Kina pr\u00e4glades av en rej\u00e4l tillspetsning under de senaste veckorna. Utvecklingen fick dessutom en ytterligare p\u00e5sp\u00e4dning genom en n\u00e5got hastig f\u00f6rsvagning av den kinesiska valutan yuan \u2013 en f\u00f6rsvagning som USA:s politiska ledning kallade \u201dvalutamanipulation\u201d.<\/p>\n
F\u00f6r egen del vill jag inte g\u00e5 lika l\u00e5ngt med mitt ordval. Hade yuanens v\u00e4xelkurs varit fritt flytande – och inte som i verkligheten flytande med uppenbara dagliga gr\u00e4nser – hade den ist\u00e4llet h\u00f6gst sannolikt blivit \u00e4nnu svagare under det g\u00e5ngna \u00e5ret. \u00d6verhuvudtaget ter det sig om\u00f6jligt att se president Trumps tre ekonomiska m\u00e5ls\u00e4ttningar och \u00f6nskem\u00e5l fungera p\u00e5 samma g\u00e5ng: \u00e4nnu l\u00e4gre r\u00e4ntor, god tillv\u00e4xt och likv\u00e4l en svagare dollar.<\/p>\n
De senaste tv\u00e5 veckorna har med all \u00f6nskad tydlighet visat att USA\/Kina-konflikten ej kan analyseras utan psykologiska, politiska och sociala infallsvinklar – https:\/\/blogg.lnu.se\/china-research\/?cat=13398<\/a> fr\u00e5n den 3 juni.<\/p>\n ————————————————————————————————————–<\/p>\n Readers of this blog may remember my previous skepticism about positive trade negotiations between the U.S. and China any time soon \u2013 unlike many other analysts did ahead of G20 summits and similar events. My doubts about a deal were \u2013 and still are \u2013 mainly based on the deep psychological divergence between the American president and the Chinese political leadership https:\/\/blogg.lnu.se\/china-research\/?cat=13398<\/a> from June 3. President Trump thinks that he has prerogative to interpret global developments in line with what he defines as \u201cAmerica first\u201d; whereas the Chinese look at their history and development with obvious pride and dislike therefore all kind of humiliation from the other side of the Pacific.<\/p>\n One can be pretty sure that the Chinese have felt strongly humiliated in recent quarters. Since the American president does not like the Chinese (politicians), space for fruitful negotiations was very limited already from the beginning of the trade tensions more than one year ago – and has become even more limited in the past few weeks. This development was no surprise and does not bode well for decreasing tensions between the two global superpowers any time soon.<\/p>\n Is China really a currency manipulator?<\/strong><\/p>\n In the beginning of August 2019, American Secretary of Finance Steven Mnuchin very angrily called China a \u201ccurrency manipulator\u201d. This was a kind of spontaneous comment since U.S. law also requires that three assumptions for such an unpleasant classification have to be met, certainly after careful analysis (see the illuminating information by the United States Government Accountability Office, GAO, https:\/\/www.gao.gov\/new.items\/d05351.pdf<\/a>, find different access). However, this was obviously not the case in the beginning of August \u2013 but still in the Treasury\u2019s evaluation from May 2019. Then, the conclusion from the analysis was that no important trading partner of the United States more recently had violated the three – by law – defined fairness indicators for exports to the United States (see the source below). However, China, Japan, Korea, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam had failed more recently in two developments of the three trade- and currency-related indicators. For this reason, the above-mentioned countries are currently set on the Treasury\u2019s so-called Monitoring List. Sweden still is not there – but probably not far away. https:\/\/home.treasury.gov\/system\/files\/206\/2019-05-28-May-2019-FX-Report.pdf<\/a> (find different access).<\/p>\n Making a more general comment, each and every country is, in principle, free of choosing its exchange rate policy, China certainly as well. However, being listed by the United States as a currency manipulator may have serious consequences for China directly and for the global economy more indirectly. But it should be repeated that real market forces most probably would have given a weaker development of the yuan vis-\u00e0-vis the USD in recent quarters – because of China\u2019s weakening growth and lagging reform activities.<\/p>\n In other words: In my view, China currently does not meet all the necessary criteria for being a currency manipulator \u2013 right in line with the conclusions of the Treasury only three months ago. However, when asking China for global currency responsibility, the same request could be sent to President Trump regarding American responsibility for global trade – preferably with China to follow with good energy to create more transparency and willingness to reform, giving this way benefit to both the Chinese and the global economy, the American certainly included.<\/p>\n Hubert Fromlet<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\n<\/em>Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
\nEditorial board<\/a><\/p>\n