Baltic Business Research

Sammanfattning

Det råder ingen tvekan om att hittillsvarande tillväxtprognoser för de relativt nya EU-länderna i Central-/Sydosteuropa och Östeuropa (EU10) kommer att behöva skrivas ned. Detta kommer också att betyda försämringar på arbetsmarknaderna. Dessa länders exportandelar till Västeuropa är helt enkelt för stora för att kunna komma undan den kommande stagnationen eller rentav recessionen i de gamla EU-länderna. Till detta kommer att en hel del EU10-länder har banksystem med stora västeuropeiska ägarandelar. Flertalet av dessa västeuropeiska banker kommer dock under 2012 – p g a stigande kapitalkrav – att agera mer försiktigt på kreditsidan, vilket också kommer att drabba kreditaspiranter i de relativt nya EU- marknadsekonomierna. Detta hot betyder ett speciellt ansvar för Swedbank och SEB i de baltiska länderna. De baltiska ländernas återhämtningsprocess skulle på allvar hotas av en förnyad kreditklämma.

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Last summer, forecasters believed in quite a decent economic growth in the relatively new EU-member states (EU10-countries) – somewhere between 3 ½- and 4% in 2012, i.e. almost in line with potential growth. Looking at the ongoing deterioration of Western European demand, there is every reason to believe that the new trend will have a negative impact on EU10 at least in 2012. Only a very limited GDP-growth rate can be expected for the whole group of countries – with Poland having the best odds to avoid a recession.

Another impediment to growth in this usually quite dynamic region is probably coming from Western banks which have significant or dominating market shares in the credit business of EU 10 countries. Now, the banks in Western Europé start up a period of consolidation and improvements of capital requirements. The will partly happen at the expense of credit volumes and risk-taking.

However, this procyclical behavior is not very useful for the banks’ corporate customers in EU10-countries. And it is – if taken too ambitiously – not beneficial in a macroeconomic sense either.

Two major Swedish banks, Swedbank and SEB, should this time – contrary to the period of 2006-2008 – stick to their responsibility vis-à-vis the Baltic states. Then, they did ”everything” to contribute to irresponsible credit growth in Estonia, Lithuania and particularly Latvia. This time when several big Swedish banks strategically look for a very high return on capital – maybe unrealisticly high – the risk of a too limited supply of new credits must not be neglected.    

Relatively low economic activity in the forthcoming quarters could also mean that stabilization or improvements of the mostly negative current account balances in EU10 may lead to premature positive conclusions. In other words: The ten (relatively) new EU-member countries have continuously to concentrate on structural economic policy that favors education, innovation, entrepreneurship, institutions, labor markets, new or improved products (more value-added) and also conditions for the working population when considering the demographic challenges. All this is needed to achieve fundamental improvements in current account balances.

It is certainly desirable that E(M)U leaders in their search for a revised EMU and stability model also seriously take EU10 countries into account. Now Europe is preparing its new structural economic policy model. In the longer run, this may lead to an happy end compared to the ongoing paralyzed reform process in the U.S. But E(M)U countries first have to manage their very depressed confidence and liquidity crises – a challenge that also EU10 now increasingly gets involved in.

Altogether, its seems to be premature to predict worsening conditions for long-term business in the Baltic Sea region and the other EU10 members. A structurally strengthened EU in its Western and Southern parts would be very positive for all EU10 countries and even the old member states. Such a development is still a realistic option some years from now – despite the current doomday talk by (mainly) anglosaxon financial markets.