In the 19th century, conquering colonies was an indicator of power for European states. As a newly established state, Germany was slow to enter the colonial struggle, by the mid-1880s they became interested in acquiring colonies in Africa in an attempt to compete with established colonialists like Great Britain and France[i]. One of the colonies they acquired was in Southwest Africa, today’s Namibia. The main goal of Germany was settling the area where the Herero and Nama indigenous tribes lived. However, the tribes resisted the occupation[ii] and despite the resistance German settlers took control of a quarter of the region and planned to develop a railway line that would further divide the region in two.
The resistance of the indigenous population hurt the ego of Germany and strength of their military apparatus– the German forces resorted to extensive use of violence against the indigenous population to maintain their supremacy at all costs.[iii]They showed vengeful behavior against their enemies by killing women and children, going so far as poisoning the course of water to force them to die of thirst. Sadly, the fate of the survivors was bleak since they constituted the slave labor in the cities of German settlers in Africa[iv]. As a result, in the three years 1904-7, a robust population of 80.000 Hereros’ turned into a starving populous of 15,000[v]. The consequences of the Herero and Nama Genocide had such an impact on the German political scene that it resulted in the dissolution of parliament on the 13th of December 1906 after the calling of elections prompted by the Center Party’s rejection of a request for 29 million marks in supplementary funding for the expedition in Southwest Africa[vi]. So, it is unsurprising that Germany’s colonial policy (Weltpolitik) was the main issue[vii] in the political conflict between the two parties. On the one hand, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) argued for the unprofitability of colonial expenses[viii]. On the other hand, it created a political alliance that supported German colonial policy that won the election. Notably, the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (DKG)[ix] used cinema as a propaganda medium to show the suffering and privation of German soldiers during the Herero War[x].
The colonial alliance drew their arguments from social Darwinism[xi] in order to justify their policy and the genocide. The phrases “non-human” and “bloodthirsty beast”[xii] were evidence that the Herero rebellion and Nama resistance were not the only factors in which German forces used such extensive violence and how racism and European superiority motivated their actions.
The line of racist reasoning allowed proponents of the genocide to present the actions of the German forces as a response to the crimes committed by the indigenous populations by targeting European civilization[xiii]. The Germans resorted to a common practice of presenting themselves as defenseless[xiv] in order to be able to justify the atrocities they committed against the Herero and Nama. A typical example of how the German settlers portrayed the situation in the colonies was that they believed the surviving indigenous were a danger to them, when in fact the German authorities were oppressing the Herero and Nama[xv] leaving them to live in miserable conditions.
[i] Norman M. Naimark, Genocide: A World History, The New Oxford World History (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017). P. 66.
[ii] Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). P. 381.
[vi] John Phillip Short, Magic Lantern Empire: Colonialism and Society in Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). P. 135
[vii] Wolfgang Fuhrmann, Imperial Projections: Screening the German Colonies, First paperback edition, Film Europa, Vol. 17 (New York Oxford: Berghahn, 2017). P. 83.
[xiv] Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, Oxford Handbooks in History (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). P. 105.
The Roman conquest of Dacia was more than just a military victory—it was a profound act of colonization that reshaped the region’s identity. While often framed as a story of civilization and progress, this transformation raises important questions about cultural erasure, power, and resistance. This blog post examines the contrast between Sarmizegetusa Regia, the sacred heart of Dacia, and Colonia Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa, the Roman-imposed colony, to challenge dominant narratives of conquest and explore the lasting impacts of Roman imperialism through a decolonial lens.
Rome’s Triumph and Transformation
After intense wars (101–102 AD, 105–106 AD), Emperor Trajan conquered Dacia, reshaping its landscape. Dacian sanctuaries were destroyed, the native population declined significantly, and about 40.000 Roman troops settled in. Unlike other provinces, Dacia saw rapid colonization rather than gradual assimilation. Roman historian Flavius Eutropius documented this rapid transformation, with Sarmizegetusa serving as a notable example.
Two Sarmizegetusas: Dacian vs. Roman
Before the Roman conquest, Sarmizegetusa Regia was the capital and most significant military, religious, and political centre of the Dacian kingdom. Situated in the Orăștie Mountains, it served as the stronghold of Dacian kings, including Decebal, and housed grand sanctuaries dedicated to their deities. The city was heavily fortified, featuring an advanced defensive system and impressive stone structures.
Following Trajan’s victory in 106 AD, the Romans sought to establish their dominance by creating a new city: Colonia Ulpia Traiana Augusta Dacica Sarmizegetusa. This settlement, about 40 km away from the former Dacian capital, was built as a colony for Roman veterans and functioned as an administrative and economic centre rather than a capital in the modern sense. Unlike Sarmizegetusa Regia, which was a sacred and strategic centre for the Dacians, the Roman Sarmizegetusa symbolized colonization, urban planning, and the cultural transformation of Dacia.
Map of the Two Sarmizegetusas (Source: istorieveche.ro)
A Symbolic Stronghold
The story of Dacia’s transformation is vividly depicted on Trajan’s Column in Rome. This monumental relief, completed in 113 AD, chronicles the conquest through detailed carvings of battles, fortifications, and Roman engineering achievements. While Colonia Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa itself is not explicitly represented, the column portrays key moments of Romanization, including military encampments, road construction, and the establishment of new settlements—elements essential to Dacia’s transformation.
Trajan’s campaign in Dacia, Sarmatian and Roman cavalry at battle during Trajan’s campaign in Dacia, relief from Trajan’s Column, Rome. (Source: Encyclopædia Britannica)
Founded in 106 AD, Colonia Ulpia Traiana Augusta Dacica Sarmizegetusa was more than a city—it was Rome’s statement of power. Strategically placed between Transylvania and the Danube, it also held symbolic weight, reclaiming the site of past Roman defeats. The Romans kept its Dacian name, cementing their rule over the former kingdom.
Initially a military fortress, it grew into an administrative and economic centre. Contrary to popular belief, it wasn’t the capital of Roman Dacia but served as the province’s administrative headquarters. Yet, the true importance of this distant territory to Rome remains a subject of debate. Was it purely strategic, or did it hold deeper economic or symbolic value? Its true significance remains an open question.
Conclusion: Decolonizing the Narrative
Today, the ruins of Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa in Romania offer a glimpse into a once-thriving Roman settlement. Visitors can explore ancient forums, streets, and remnants of imperial ambitions. However, beyond the grandeur of Roman engineering lies a more profound story—the material legacy of imperial expansion. The transformation of Sarmizegetusa was not simply an urban project; it was an act of colonial domination that imposed a new order on conquered people. By reflecting on this history, we can challenge the traditional glorification of empire and consider the perspectives of those whose voices were silenced. Re-examining Rome’s legacy in Dacia through a decolonial lens deepens our understanding of the broader patterns of conquest, resistance, and cultural survival that continue to shape our world today.
The Ancient Ruins of Sarmizegetusa (Source: PeMeleaguri.ro)
For Further Reading
Bărbulescu, Mihai et al., Istoria României [History of Romania]. Bucharest: Corint Educațional, 2014.
Cassius, Dio. Roman History, Books 67–68. Translated by Earnest Cary. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.
Eutropius, Flavius. Breviarium Historiae Romanae. Translated by H.W. Bird. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993.
MacKendrick, Paul. The Dacian Stones Speak. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.
Oțetea, Andrei. Istoria României [History of Romania]. Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1970.
The term ‘race’ in Swedish is rarely used, but if it is, for example in scientific contexts, it is used in quotation marks to signal that it is not an accepted term. The term thus has a somewhat different meaning in Swedish compared with, for example, the use of the term race in the USA. The concept of race has been declared invalid by contemporary science as it lacks scientific evidence, but despite this, people today are attributed different values based on these ideas. Racism, however, is thus very present in contemporary Sweden. Although the concept of race is ‘empty’, it is important to make differences in society that are based on the notion of race visibly, as it is present.
In this understanding race does not exists, but racism does. This can be shown in the Swedish society where in theory everyone has equal rights and opportunities, but not in practice. Government reports show that there is a difference between immigrants or non-whites and Swedes or whites. It has also been shown that Swedish citizens born in Sweden but still tend to be categorized as immigrants in everyday speech, because they have immigrant parents. The notion is that these individuals belong to ‘a different culture’, have a ‘different ethnicity’ and often have a ‘different skin color’. ‘They’ are thus neither in nor outside the categories ‘we’ and ‘Swedes’.
Ethnicity is a concept that has had a great impact and is widely used in various explanatory models in Swedish research within social science. It is used to explain differences between people in terms of behavior and characteristics. Thus, Ethnicity, like race, is about dividing individuals into groups to discuss the characteristics of different groups. Ethnicity is as ‘empty’ a concept as race, but is ‘politically correct’, and has nevertheless come to be used extensively. The difference is that ethnicity has its origins in culture and not racial biology. Ethnicity should therefore be used with caution.
There is a self-image in Sweden and a tendency to avoid the concept of race and racism. Recognizing the existence of racism would damage Swedish identity and therefore racism is neglected and/or denied. The concept of ethnicity to explain differences between people and to some extent phenomena such as xenophobia and racism is common today by scholars and in general. Replacing race with other terms has become more common among racists and xenophobes as well, but it is the same concept but in different words.
Why do Swedes not talk about racism? This became clear when I examined a social studies textbook for the Swedish upper secondary school. Race and racism as phenomena were discussed, but without using the terms. In one paragraph it was described how immigrants have more difficulty entering the labor market and taking part in the Swedish welfare state, but structural racism was not mentioned. I think this has to do with what was described above. In some kind of zeal for goodness, desire for political correctness, and shame values that are considered ‘un-Swedish’ are a part of Swedish society. This has resulted in racist expressions being more difficult to identify and thus more difficult to combat.
Bibliography
Eliassi, B. (2017) Conceptions of Immigrant Integration and Racism Among Social Workers in Sweden, Journal of Progressive Human Services, 28:1, 6-35, DOI: 10.1080/10428232.2017.1249242
Ericsson, Martin, (2016), Historisk forskning om rasism och främlingsfientlighet i Sverige: en analyserande kunskapsöversikt, Stockholm: Forum för levande historia.
Fredrickson, George M., (2005), Rasism: en historisk översikt. Lund: Historiska media
Hübinette, Tobias (2017), ”Den färgblinda antirasismen slår tillbaka”, i: Hübinette, Tobias (red.), Ras och vithet: Svenska rasrelationer igår och idag, Stockholm.
Karlsson, Lars-Olof (2011) Arena 123, Stockholm.
Sernhede, Ove (2022) ”Etnicitet” i Christofer Edling & Fredril Liljefors (red.) Ett delat samhälle- Makt, interektionalitet och social skiktning. Stockholm.
Wasniowski, Andréaz,, (2017), ”Rasismens former – om vetenskapligt och ideologiskt tänkande”, i: Hübinette, Tobias (red.), Ras och vithet: Svenska rasrelationer igår och idag, Stockholm.
Raewyn Connell is an Australian sociologist who in an article from 1997 criticized the sociological canon, i.e. what is usually referred to as the ‘classical theory’. If you open just about any book aimed at undergraduate students in sociology, you will likely read about Karl Marx, E´mile Durkheim, and Max Weber, whom Cornell describes as ‘the founding fathers’. Because of this, classical theory focuses on class, alienation, and industrialization. These elements have been and are important for European development.
The familiar canon embodies an untenable foundation story of great men theorizing European modernity. Sociology actually emerged from a broad cultural dynamic in which tensions of liberalism and empire were central. Global expansion and colonization gave sociology its main conceptual framework and much of its data, key problems, and methods. After early-20th-century crisis, a profoundly reconstructed American discipline emerged, centered on difference and disorder within the metropole. The retrospective creation of a “classical” canon solved certain cultural dilemmas for this enterprise and generated a discipline-defining pedagogy, at the price of narrowing sociology’s intellectual scope and concealing much of its history (Cornell, 1997).
This leaves little room for analyses of, for example, race and gender. But not because race, gender and sexuality were not central issues in sociology at this time, but because they have been ignored. W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in 1901 that the color line was “the problem of the 20th century”, which was not an uncommon statement at the time. Cornell argues that we need to revise the sociological canon: “Sociology can be introduced to students not as a story of ‘great men’”. She argues that it cannot be undone but needs to be replaced by our own history, because these theories were constructed in a colonial world.
These ‘founders’ are still used by Connell and others. They are theories that travel with us in time, which is precisely what makes them classic, and therefore they are important to retain, states Michael Coroway. He argues that whether the sociological canon should be retained or completely revamped is a current debate in the field. He criticizes Connell´s previous arguments and highlights the value of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim as a sociological canon. There are certainly important and applicable theorists like Du Bois who need to be emphasized more, but not at the expense of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. It is not possible to ‘just’ add Du Bois to the existing canon. It would mean rebuilding a canon based on completely new relationships and a new review of all these theorists. It would thus require a recalibration of all of them. When Marx was added to the canon, Weber and Durkheim were not removed but were re-read with ‘Marx’s glasses’ and put in dialogue with each other.
It is precisely under the premise that a canon is relational that the biggest question mark over a change is raised. It is thus a dialogue between theories. Du Bois has written important and significant works such as The Philadelphia Negro (1899) and The Souls of Black Folk (1903), but although he has made important contributions, he is not automatically a candidate for a place in the canon. The inclusion of Du Bois could be the fall of the canon, but it could also enhance it with a broader content on race, colonialism, and imperialism. However, this would require a great deal of effort and review, but also not to focus too much on Du Bois’ early texts where he, for example, had difficulties relating to Durkheim. In his later works, he engages in dialogue with Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. In conclusion, Coroway believes that the canon would benefit from the addition of Du Bois for greater inclusion but needs to be done with caution.
Bibliography
Burawoy, M. (2021). Why is classical theory classical? Theorizing the canon and canonizing Du Bois. Journal of Classical Sociology, 21(3-4), 245-259. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X211036955
Connell, R. W. (1997). Why Is Classical Theory Classical? American Journal of Sociology, 102(6), 1511–1557. https://doi.org/10.1086/231125
Is a debate in Sweden that originates from the tradition of racial biology research conducted in Uppsala in the early 20th century. This ‘research’ has resulted in preserving Sámi remains, documentation, and information about Sámi in archives and universities. The debate centers on whether Sámi associations demand that objects and remains be returned to their original locations, while on the other hand, universities want to preserve them for research.
Carolina Rediviva is the university library in Uppsala and restores material from the Institute of Racial Biology that was founded in 1921 by the Swedish parliament. If you know how to request this material is available for the broader public. The archive includes letters, reports, diaries, and different accounts from the institute and its board, publications from the institute, and more. It also includes an archive of about 12,000 photographs taken by the racial biologist Herman Lundborg between 1916 and 1935. Lundborg wrote The racial characters of the Swedish Nation published in 1926.
Image 1: Cover and archive box
Source: Lundborg, Herman, 1926, The racial characters of the Swedish Nation.
This ‘scientific’ structure includes images of people. Lundborg starts by describing ‘the Nordic type’, but not by using photographs. The people exhibited in this category are famous and known for their beauty, knowledge, and greatness. The ‘non-Nordic types’ are portrayed differently first it is photographs of contemporary people, and secondly, they are elderly and badly worn people that represent this category—an intention to show a clear hierarchy.
Image 2: ‘Nordic Types’
Source: Lundborg, Herman, 1926, The racial characters of the Swedish Nation.
Although this is horrible enough, there are also pictures of naked Sámi preserved at Carolina Rediviva from the department. These photographs show real humans but without names, that everyone can access through a form on the university website. This certainly raises the question of whether this material should be available to the public. Such material is important to preserve for research and therefore needs to be available. Especially in a country like Sweden which has had a tradition of neglecting Swedish colonialism in the writing of history and is therefore needed to provide a truthful story. Uppsala University also argues that the material must be available because the Institute of Racial Biology was a government agency, which means that administrative documents must be public and governed by Swedish law Arkivlagen (1990:782). From the perspective of the Sámi population, relatives live with the knowledge that there may be photographs, and other documentation of their elderly relatives available to the public.
Bibliography
Fur, Gunlög and Hennessey, John L., 2020, ”Svensk kolonialism, Sverige och kolonialism eller svenskar och kolonialism?” Historisk tidskrift 140:3.
it was a significant period in german history: the genocide of tens of thousands of individuals in german southwest africa following a revolt against colonial governance by the ovaherero and nama people. over a century later, a feature film delves into the violent actions carried out by germany in present-day namibia, shedding light on this dark colonial history for the first time, in that format. the director – lars kraume – aims for measures of men to raise awareness among everyday germans about this tragic chapter of their history. he stateted that “germany has denied its colonial past for 120 years, […] most people are unaware germany even had a colonial past, let alone anything about the brutality of it – it is not even taught in schools” (connolly 2023).
in the film, alexander hoffmann (leonard scheicher), a fictional young ethnologist sets out on a research expedition to the german colony of southwest africa, where he initiates the collection of human skulls for his “racial research”. during this endeavour, he observes the genocide carried out by the “deutsche schutztruppe,” the military unit responsible for upholding the german empire, against the ovaherero and nama tribes from 1904 to 1908. however, beyond merely observing these atrocities, the ethnologist progressively transitions into a perpetrator himself.
terminologies such as “moral decay” (tschierse 2023) or “moral degeneration” (connolly 2023) are quite common in reviews and media coverage regarding the character of hoffman making for a character with a bizarre image of an innocent german who just happened to be part of a genocide, something like hanna arendt’s “hanswurst”.
kraume emphasised that due to germany’s role as a perpetrator during this period there is no redeeming quality to the character. “create a film about genuine heroes wherever you find them, but it is impossible to fabricate a german hero.”
kraume sees hoffmann as a mirror of the german society, “they have chosen to flee – [reminiscent in …] how we continually handle africa, evading acknowledgment of the atrocities we have inflicted on the continent, and disregarding their issues as if they are unrelated to us” (connolly 2023).
the director tries to discover how the genocide was made possible shaped by “colonial mentality” (assheuer 2023). interesting is that the colonial mentality was also used to avoid blame by the very first apology by a german official toward the overherero and nama victims (arens 2024). the film is however attempting to show the spirit of modernity and social-darwinism prevalent in the wilhelminan era in germany. therefore, the film has been described as: “it lets us stare into our own abyss” (ttt 2023).
kraume uses the protagonist to show how easily one can become caught up in the dealings of a state even when you initially opposed them (assheuer 2023), thus he wants to portray the only position he can. but at the same moment, it might just be seen as a mechanism to avoid guilt and responsibility.
the film has further been criticised for pushing racism and genocide on a level of personal failure and away from a structural coloniality critique. thus, a viewing is made possible that rids germany and germans nowadays of any responsibility (kelly and malonda 2023). making for a similar argument and guilt aversion as the german government in its proposed joint declaration with namibia concerning the genocide (arens 2024).
after the premiere at the berlinale film festival of 2023, an open letter by the schwarze filmschaffende (black filmmakers) was sent to influential figures in the german cultural industry, it criticised the prevalent anti-black racism in films shown at the festival that year, including der vermessene mensch. the main points were that the genocide was only a secondary plotline rendering the victims mere extras leading to the humanising of the perpetrators whilst denying it to the victims, while simultaneously recreating images that have the potential to re-traumatise without holding educational potential (schwarze filmschaffende e.v. 2023: 4-5). the film fails even to point towards the resistance on the side of the ovaherero and nama dismissing historically important figures such as hendrik witbooi and samuel maharero (fanizadeh 2023) – making the stamen by kraume that film about heroes should be made when they are present frankly bizarre.
that presentation is rather common for german media engagement with the colonial past, usually drawing on the explorer and adventurer genre in connection with glorifying “civilising mission” (weber and weber 2020: 104). the film also fails at the portrayal of the historical events, relying on a one-dimensional account of it that lacks accuracy. it has been described as “a crude eurocentric narrowing” (fanizadeh 2023).
the only non-white actor who is afforded a role that gives her distinct features as a character is kezia kunouje kambazembi played by girley jazama who was also central to the promotion of the film and was showcased as an ovaherero woman whose ancestors were targeted by the german troops. it was however done to an extent that far exceeded her role and did leave the aftertaste of tokenism.
natasha kelly a german anti-racism activist and academic schooler was commissioned in 2021 to make an anti-racism assessment of an early script of the film, already then criticising the plotline as romanticising, far removed from reality and too much centred around the white characters (kelly and malonda 2023).
lars kraume justified the use of said perspective as a result of his position as a white german and that it would also be inappropriate for him to tell a story of ovaherero and nama resistance. he also used that to account for the passivity of the non-german characters. he further sees the film as one part of many to work against colonial amnesia in germany thus it is supposed to hold up a mirror to the german society (deutschlandradio 2023).
one of the producers added that the film aimed to bring the topic into public consciousness as well as explore the part science and universities played in the genocide (haikali and dobson 2023: 404). the idea of the film was to first tell the story and enable namibian and especially ovaherero and nama filmmakers to tell further stories, thus functioning as a gateway for funding and publicity.
the reception in namibia was also good but as there were only two screenings in windhoek, exes to the film were limited hindering any wide reception (ibid.: 109).
the question must be asked then why the film funding went to kraume and not to, let’s say ovaherero and nama directors to tell the story or why at the very least he didn’t co-direct the film with more suitable storytellers. girley jazama who is also a producer and screenwriter even expressed willingness to tell her family story (renk 2023). the unwillingness of kraume to step back or share power might be seen in line with that “most black namibians have no safe space, agency or resources to express stories of colonial oppression and atrocity inflicted on them from own perspectives and for imagining or rather telling alternative narratives” (haikali and dobson 2023: 407).
kraume said that jazama was involved, but it is hard to allocate creative inspiration, thus she is not listed as a writer in the film (deutschlandradio 2023). it was reported that other than girley jazama only one overerero was involved in the filming process, namely a costume designer (tschierse 2023).
during the above-mentioned anti-racism assessment of 2021, it was already suggested to the director to have a more diverse writers’ room to accurately tell the story and give the black characters agency. a suggestion specially made regarding the character of kezia kunouje kambazembi and the long-standing problem of white men portraying racialized women, rendering them passive objects as is the case in the film (kelly and malonda 2023).
many ways could have been explored to avoid the problem the film holds and could actually work against colonial amnesia.
the schwarzen filmschaffenden thus conclude that: “the racist murders and brutalisation of black bodies in white-majority societies are due in large part to the dissemination of such images that reinforce the belief that the lives of black people do not matter” (schwarze filmschaffende e.v. 2023: 5).
haikali, joel and dobson, stephen. 2023. understanding liminality and intangible difficult heritage through film. the historic environment: policy & practice (14)3: 402-414.
kelly, natasha and malonda, achan. der vermessene film — kolumne malonda feat. natasha a. kelly. veto mag. https://veto-mag.de/achan-natasha/. published 2023.04.18, accessed 2024.03.24.
renk. 2023. „der vermessene mensch“ ein interview mit der hauptdarstellerin girley charlene jazama. renk magazin. https://renk-magazin.de/der-vermessene-mensch/. published 2023.03.24, accessed 2024.03.26.
weber, heloise and weber, martin. 2020. colonialism, genocide and international relations: the namibian–german case and struggles for restorative relations. european journal of international relations 26(1): 91-115.
The article that sparked my interest in the topic of my Master’s thesis deals with the idea of decolonial justice and the reparations proposed by the CARICOM Reparations Justice Program. The need for a decolonial justice approach is crucial, as the conceptualization of justice stems from a European epistemology created to justify colonial crimes. However, an honest conversation in a postcolonial context can only be held when the repressive system is abandoned. “Hence, to repair means to restore not only the legal dignity of the subject but to recognize the Other as equal” (Atiles-Osoria 2018: 364). A central notion is that “justice operates through recognition, generosity, and the ability to feel for/with the Other” (ibid., 350).
This idea is connected to Kora Andrieu’s outline of apologies: “the acknowledgment of a wrongdoing, the acceptance of one’s responsibility, and the expression of sorrow and regret for it” (2009: 5) with the aim of forgiveness. This can also be problematic when self-redemption becomes more critical than the role and voice of the victims (e.g., Czollek 2023). Andrieu touches upon this issue with the example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), whose focus lay on “restoration and forgiveness,” pressuring victims to forgive (2009: 7). The TRC emphasized convincing victims to grant forgiveness, thereby granting amnesty to the perpetrators.(Bevernage 2011: 53).
Andrieu argues that reconciliation results from several factors such as “criminal justice policies, truth commissions, reparations, and reforms” (2009: 8). She points toward the power of apologies, when done properly, not to close the book but rather to open the conversation (ibid., 13). This aligns with the change in the power paradigm where the victim is now at the center and the perpetrator is at the margin (ibid.: 16-17). This connects to the idea that the non-beings are lifted from that realm into the seen, drawing on Fanon, Césaire, and Maldonado-Torres (Atiles-Osoria 2018: 350).
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has also been criticized by notable scholars such as Jacques Derrida, who stated that the TRC could transform into a tool for “exercise in forgetting” (Bevernage 2011: 48), thus hindering a conversation about the past or opening a space for mourning. It can go so far as to exclude victims from the “new South Africa” if they are unwilling to forgive, blaming them for hindering the rebuilding of the nation (ibid.: 60), thus leaving almost no space for recognition of hurt or reparations.
References
Andrieu, Kora (2009) Sorry for the Genocide: How Public Apologies can help Promote National Reconciliation. In: Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 38(1) pp 3-23.
Atiles-Osoria, José (2018) Colonial state crimes and the CARICOM mobilization for reparation and justice. In: State Crimes 7(4), pp: 349-368.
Bevernage, Berber (2011) History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice. London: Taylor & Francis Group.
Czollek, Max (2023) Versöhnungstheater. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag.
The trilogy of The Lord of the Rings is a tale about the fight between good and evil. The Dark Lord Sauron has created an army to conquer the world. He needs the Ring of Power to accomplish his goal of obtaining the power he desires. At the same time, Frodo, the protagonist who has acquired the Ruling Ring, starts his journey to destroy it, accompanied by the Fellowship of the Ring, a small group of warriors.
Interestingly, we can trace some features of colonial narratives in this tale by examining the poem that is engraved on the Ring:
“Three Rings for the Elven-kings under the sky, Seven for the Dwarf-lords in their halls of stone, Nine for Mortal Men doomed to die, One for the Dark Lord on his dark throne In the Land of Mordor where the Shadows lie. One Ring to rule them all, One Ring to find them, One Ring to bring them all and in the darkness bind them In the Land of Mordor where the Shadows lie.” [i]
By analyzing the poem, the reader can comprehend the purpose of the Ring. The Ring can give its owner the absolute power to dominate others. Hence, it can be seen as a metaphor for colonial rule, describing the domination of Europeans over the rest of the world. The Ring, as a symbol of absolute power, gives its creator the ability to conquer the world. Similarly, European nations relied on their weapons, economy, and civilization to dominate the rest of the world. [ii]
At the same time, they gave the illusion that others had a share of power, but they operated as Europe’s vassals. In other words, we could read this poem as a metaphor for European dominance over the world. Indeed, it is no coincidence that three of the main heroes come from the races being ruled. Thus, we could say that the three races in Tolkien’s work represent the populations and cultures of the continents that came under European rule and now try to oppose it by destroying the source of its power.
We can trace Mignolo’s concept of decolonialism within the tale of The Lord of the Rings. Mignolo claims that decolonialism not only refers to the independence movements of colonies, but also to the task of decoloniality: to decolonize knowledge and to delink it from the notion of European dominance. [iii] Furthermore, the distinction among races should not be overlooked, as the one assigned to destroy the Ring does not belong to those races. It is implied that these races have been corrupted by power. Thus, the hobbits could function as a symbol for the native populations who are often labeled as uncivilized [vi], whose existence and way of life are often ignored by dominant sources [v], just as the existence of hobbits is unknown even to the older and wiser beings such as the Ents:
“What are you, I wonder? I cannot place you. You do not seem to come in the old lists that I learned when I was young.”[vi]
[i] J. R. R. Tolkien and J. R. R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring, 2. ed., [renewed], The Lord of the Rings / by J. R. R. Tolkien 1 (Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 1993). P. 66
[ii] Bill Ashcroft author, Postcolonial Studies: The Key Concepts, Third edition, Routledge Key Guides (London; New York, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, Routledge, 2013).P. 140
[iii] Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine E. Walsh, On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis (Durham, UNITED STATES: Duke University Press, 2018),http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/linne- ebooks/detail.action?docID=5400137. P. 121
[iv] Bill Ashcroft author, Postcolonial Studies. P.174
[v] Diana Brydon, Peter Forsgren, and Gonlüg Fur, Concurrent Imaginaries, Postcolonial Worlds: Toward Revised Histories (Boston, UNITED STATES: BRILL, 2017), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/linne-ebooks/detail.action? docID=5024368. Pp. 40-41
[vi] J R R Tolkien (John Ronald Reuel), The Two Towers: Being the Second Part of The Lord of the Rings, 2. ed.., Tolkien, J. R. R. (John Ronald Reuel), 1892-1973. Lord of the Rings (1986) ; Pt. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1993). Pp. 67-8
Two years ago, I moved to Sweden – a white cis woman born and raised in Germany. Today, I want to reflect on my white experience as a migrant in Sweden.
To be clear from the beginning, this blog post aims to address readers with white privilege. To all BIPOC readers (Black, Indigenous, and people of color): I know you have better things to do than waste your time reading how a white person fails to understand their privilege (unless you want to be amused by the attempt). Most importantly, the upcoming lines should not be read as information on what white privilege means (as a white person, I am certainly not an expert on that), but rather as a personal reflection as part of my learning process. With this, I follow the call from many BIPOC voices, as articulated by Ijeoma Oluo [i] : “White people: I don’t want you to understand me better; I want you to understand yourselves. Your survival has never depended on your knowledge of white culture. In fact, it’s required your ignorance.” And sadly, but true, representing one central aspect of this privilege: I can talk about racism without being seen as hypersensitive or self-interested.
First, my identity as a German woman in Sweden was never challenged or seen as something inconsistent that had yet to make sense. My proclaimed reason for being here – to study – was never questioned. I am never under any pressure to disclose anything personal about myself to either justify my identity or my presence in this country. In situations where I prefer not to stand out, I can simply choose not to speak and blend in as a Swede.
I do not speak Swedish. Yet, I have never faced criticism or heard discussions about my “poor integration”. Even my admission that I am not making any effort to learn the language has not unsettled the “a priori integrated” label assigned to me. Additionally, most of my friends here are German, and our gatherings are not seen as a “parallel society” discussed as a challenge that needs to be solved.
Even if I don’t comply with all the ostensible norms of Swedish society, I am not perceived as a threat to Swedish identity. I am simply seen as an individual. For example, openly rejecting monogamy in my personal romantic relationship is sometimes even perceived as cool and revolutionary. In contrast, racialized people making the same decision are often discriminated against and judged for not complying with the values of Sweden as their “host country”. They also contend with the fear of unintentionally reinforcing racist stereotypes. Unlike them, I don’t have to be burdened with the responsibility of representing an entire group of people. When I forgot to update my address after moving or was confronted about speaking too loudly in public, it is seen as a personal oversight rather than a reflection of my German culture or all white people.
Alice Hasters [ii] made me aware of the absence of certain unsettling thoughts when faced with perceived rejection. She writes about her experience of wondering whether the seat next to her on the bus is empty because of her being black or simply by chance. Contrastingly, when I was refused in my attempt to open a bank account in Sweden, I didn’t have to ask myself, “Did I not get the account because I am white?”
I was never confronted in the university about paying tuition fee, and it is not just my German passport privilege that saves me from discrimination but also the intersection with my skin color since I am not expected of having to pay fees. Overall, I am just not marked as different. I understand why white people do not see themselves as migrants. Because our experience is informed by a prior belonging and the entitlement to inhabit foreign places.
I am aware that this is just a small part of what it means to be a white migrant in Sweden. However, the only thing I have certainly understood so far is that I will never get this right. And therefore, I am committed to be receptive and embrace any feedback I get from BIPOC regarding my unaware aspects of white privilege and any racist behavior – in this blog-post and beyond. Knowing that they are putting themselves at risk and insecurity, while the worst that happens to me is discomfort – so please, Alina – resist your white fragility! [iii] I try to remind myself of Layla Saad’s words “No matter how bad it feels to wake up to the pain, shame, and guilt of your racism, those feelings will never come anywhere close to the pain BIPOC experience as a result of your racism” [iv]. The least I can do is not stopping to think of myself in racial terms and pointing out my own and other white people racism, because BIPOC do not get a break from (my) white supremacy either – since they would even have to deal with us idiots complaining about reverse racism when they want to breathe by creating or joining BIPOC-only-spaces or wish to get a BIPOC teacher.
I’m a little worried of reading this blog post five years from now and feeling ashamed of how limited my understanding was back then. But honestly, I also wish that’s exactly what will happen, because then I’ll have moved on.
… and for all white people who are not yet comfortable with these lines looking critically at themselves, Mohamed Amjahid [v] has a fitting and somewhat ironic answer: “I can speak from my own experience: you get used to being studied and described”.
[i] Ijeoma Oluo (2018) So You Want to Talk About Race. Seal Press.
[ii] Alice Hasters (2019) Was weiße Menschen nicht über Rassismus hören wollen: aber wissen sollten. Hanserblau.
[iii] Robin DiAngelo (2018) White Fragility: Why It’s So Hard for White People to Talk About Racism. Beacon Press.
[iv] Layla Saad (2022) Me and White Supremacy: How to Recognize Your Privilege, Combat Racism and Change the World. Hachette UK Distribution – Iwuk.
[v] Mohamed Amjahid (2021) Der weiße Fleck: Eine Anleitung zu antirassistischem Denken. Piper. [my translation from German to English]
The Westphalian state system is very much alive and kicking, at least as a meta-theoretical lens through which we observe the world. However, and here I quote one of Marx’s perhaps most famous lines ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.’ Is this not also the foundation upon which the very idea of decolonisation rests? Not just to observe the effects on colonialism in a postcolonial society, to actively decolonise it! In a sense this is an ongoing academical debate, and to anyone who follows it, it is clearly a heated debate. However, as I write this, there is philosophical current which has been incredibly efficient in not just describing the political world, but to shape it through discursive means. It is the state-oriented Realist school within International Relations.
Allegory of the Peace of Westphalia, by Jacob Jordaens from Wikipedia
The idea that the state-system is one of constant, and often deadly, competition is an old one which rests on centuries of Enlightenment ideals of rationality. It has reigned supreme in its ideologically hegemonic position for so long that we even call it ‘realism’, for they do after all call it the way they see it. And what they see in today’s international system, is a return to the old idea of power-balance and the threat of war. I am of course referring to both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing genocide in Gaza. While no school of thought can change the atrocities taking place, the way in which they become codified and articulated by international actors do very much shape the way in which actions become legitimised. I will briefly look at two cases of perceived justifications of violence.
Firstly, the invasion of Ukraine in 2021 greatly helped the former realist concept of balance-of-power to re-enter the mainstream discourse, both in academic terms but also in general media coverage. Consider the way in which NATO has become one of the main political topics of discussion in Europe, and especially Sweden. According to NOVUS which conducts regular surveys on political opinion in Sweden, the support for NATO has increased drastically, with a record of 54% for joining the military alliance and 23% against, measured in May 2022 (Novus, 2022). At the time of writing, the Turkish parliament has voted for Swedish membership, while Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, the last remaining obstacle, expected to do the same.
What does this mean? Well, Orbán, who’s no stranger to bellicose rhetoric, is also one of the few European leaders to maintain a relatively good relation with Russia after the invasion, raising questions of whether the obstruction in the Swedish NATO-matter is a political game (The Guardian, 2024). As has been covered in literature, Orbán’s discourse is often based on the notion of an ethnic Hungarian state which is under threat from a Muslim ‘invasion’ (Kovacs, 2020; Washington Post, 2015). So while the political (Westphalian, if you will) principal of self-defence is applied with regards to Sweden, there is also speculation about whether this is just power-politics and stone-cold state diplomacy. Of course, that would fit very well into the Enlightenment rationale which permeates the international state system based on the ‘realist’ school of thought.
On the other hand, the same rationale, albeit with a twist, is applied to Israel’s invasion of Gaza. Amidst heated UN debate on how to end the ongoing ‘conflict’, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres stressed the importance for a two-state solution, while US spokesperson ‘emphasized Hamas’ role in unleashing the conflict’ (UN, 2024). By now, the utter destruction of Gaza has been widely reported and many call for, if not ceasefire, at least precaution on Israel’s part to avoid humanitarian casualties. What is rarely questioned, however, is the reason for invasion. It is accepted as politically legitimate in a Westphalian state-system, to defend one’s borders. Despite occupying Gaza since 1948, Israel’s response to the October 7 attack is legitimate insofar as it corresponds to a Westphalian rational reaction to transgression of state sovereignty. That the invasion descended into what is widely recognised as genocide is not the important issue here (however harsh that may sound). The issue is that the ontological state-system with ingrained rights and responsibilities is allowed to invade from the very beginning. The October 7 attack is condemned by international actors on almost every level, and so is the horrors perpetrated by Israel, with the difference that the initial invasion by the latter is justified.
Sweden, who’s neutrality as served as a cornerstone of its international identity, now stands to join as a fully-fledged member of NATO. The decision to do so was made on rational grounds, as part of a larger geopolitical logic, in which states seek to protect themselves. Like Sweden, Israel’s to invade Gaza was a fully rational one, after all, their sovereignty was under attack. However, the decision to attack Israel by Hamas is repeatedly seen as an act of terror. Hamas is, in other words, an Other to the state system itself, an actor external but contingent to it. It serves as the irrational Other which, through its difference points to what is rational.
My aim is not to debate what constitutes acts of ‘legitimate state violence’ and ‘acts of terror’, but to hint at the link between the difference between the two being linked to the production of knowledge attributed to a ‘realist’ school of thought within academia. What scholars have called the meta-theoretical myth of Westphalia which has permeated IR discourse since the field’s conception continues to define the legitimacy of casus belli, well beyond the borders of Europe itself.
Bibliography:
Kovács, K (2020) ‘People, sovereignty and citizenship: the ethnonational populists’ constitutional vocabulary’ Statelessness & Citizenship Review, (2:2), p. 389-394
UN (2024) ‘Secretary-General Underscores Two-State Solution Only Way to End Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, One-State Formula Inconceivable, in Day-Long Debate’, United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releasehttps://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15569.doc.htm [Last Accessed: 25-01-2024]
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