China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

About bubbles in China, Sweden and elsewhere

November 3, 2016

Currently, there is an intense discussion going on whether there is a bubble on the Swedish real estate market or not. But this question should not be the point anymore. In my view, there is already a bubble without any doubt after all these years of credit boom and enormous price increases on this specific market in mainly major Swedish cities.

The question is instead whether this bubble will burst or not. Children know about this distinction when producing bubbles with their chewing gums. They want the bubble to burst by inflating it further. Financial analysts, however, have many times no feeling for such a necessary distinction between the existence of a bubble per se and its possible bursting.

So, why does the Riksbank – not literally spoken – refuse to apply this bubble phenomenon taken from the world of childhood? They do, of course, hope – unlike most children – that the bubble within the forseeable future will diminish more or less by itself and/or by the already visibly weakened Swedish currency – preferably without a major explosion, of course.

Is this, however, still possible under current overheating conditions? May be not. Probably, something drastic must happen to deflate the existing bubble on the Swedish real estate market, whatever the tool or the triggering event may be.

Moving the analysis to the Far East, China is another country having a real estate bubble right now, both what regards residential investments and the commercial real estate sector (city offices and industrial parks). Concerns (should) still increase.

What we do know from history is the fact that it normally takes quite some time until a bubble on real estate markets finally bursts – but also that the consequences of such a bursting bubble tend to be severe and long-lasting.

A very micro-oriented observation may be illustrative. I recently had the opportunity during a flight to read a leading Hong Kong-based newspaper completely from the first to the last page. One micro-oriented article was striking me particularly.

This article was about massive property sales of an extremely rich Chinese tycoon (on the highly-valued Shanghai market). He had simply concluded that the risks on Chinese real estate markets had become too high.

Ten years ago, the same tycoon paid around 3000 yuan for one square meter in this specific Shanghai project. Now it is noted that square meter prices in neighboring locations have been soaring up to 50 000 yuan. What a bubble! It may burst – or not. But risk-upgrading is still in place.

Sometimes, micro observations can cause or strengthen real macro concerns …

Hubert Fromlet
Senior Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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Hot topics for analysts inside and outside China

September 30, 2016

In the past few weeks, I met quite a number of Chinese economists at different places and conferences.

Totally, some topics were really dominating. Below, I give some brief summery of three points that have been most frequently mentioned and discussed – and of two topics that should be in the headlines:

1. The “One belt, one road”-investment plan

Clearly, the Chinese are very enthusiastic about their mega-infrastructure project “One belt, one  road” from China to Europe (Silk Road Economic Belt & Maritime Silk Road). This major investment  program is assumed to boost the domestic Chinese economy substantially. But the Chinese also emphasize that benefits will reach Western Europe. How much this really will be the case remains to be seen However, it should be said that the (Swedish) press and potentially involved companies in Sweden and other countries should have a regular eye on developments of the Chinese “One belt, one road”-plan – despite the uncertain dimensions of this project.

2.  The deterioration of U.S.-China relations

There is no doubt that the political relations between the United States and China have been deteriorating more recently. The absence of a red carpet at president Obama’s arrival to the G20 summit in Hangzhou was mostly symbolic. The underlying problems, however, are currently much deeper and more fundamental.

3. China is really concerned about Europe/the EU

China’s uncertainty about Europe/the EU and investments and sales there has obviously been increasing in the past few quarters – and even more after the British exit voting. Europe/the EU have lost recognition in China, at least currently.

4. Insufficient knowledge about the current status of Chinese economic reforms

It seems to be striking that many Chinese economists are so little informed about all the ambitious reform plans from the Third Plenum –
and how much has been achieved so far. Transparency seems to be lagging  substantially. This can be considered as a serious shortcoming. How are current short-term growth stimuli related to the planned structural reforms? No answer has been given.

5.  No comments at all on the future composition of the Standing Committee

It’s no real surprise but I have not heard any comment on next year’s new appointments for the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party, the most important political body in the People’s Republic and, consequently, for economic policy. My own feeling is that president Xi Jinping will strengthen his position in this crucial decision-making forum after the fall of 2017.
 

Hubert Fromlet
Senior Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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Poland – do (central) banks ever learn?

June 15, 2016

Trying to lower costs for interest rate payments is a natural human ambition. But nothing is free of charge. Risks may be increasing when potential gains seem to be achievable. In credit terms this is often about exchange rate risks for borrowing in foreign currencies. (This problem is, by the way, usually part of my classes in the first semester).

These considerations on credit conditions may happen by applying three alternatives: comparing nominal interest rates between two countries, expectations of a stronger own currency or both of these two alternatives as a simultaneous mix. However, the mostly existing exchange rate risks make things particularly difficult and speculative; the calculations have to be based on a forecast – and everybody should know that currency forecasts in principle are impossible. In other words: a lot of luck is needed if a credit in foreign currency really turns out to be profitable. In my view, taking such a risk is neither prudent nor smart.

But these speculations happen again and again – despite all the negative stories about it. In Sweden, we have some bad experience from the times of devaluations around 35-40 years ago when greed or limited intellectual capacity led to massive loans in Swiss francs to Swedish farmers; later on, accidents happened with lending in yen for pure domestic Swedish purposes. The same kind of mistake was also committed before the eruption of the so-called Asian crisis in the late 1990s, with several countries in mainly South East Asia being heavily involved. And the story behind the financial crisis in the Baltic countries more recently was not very different either.

Unfortunately, Poland also went into this trap – an accident I did not expect ten years ago after having met so many well-educated and well-understanding leaders at this country’s central bank from as soon as the early 1990s. From around 2006 onward, however, too many new Polish mortgage loans were granted in Swiss francs, combined with strong expectations of an ever strengthening zloty. In 2008, finally, this development was reversed. The zloty weakened on trend. The central bank and the banks should have reacted before that. The zloty moved at last on a long-lasting downward trend. Thus, previous expectations of very favorable credit conditions were not met anymore.

Consequently, many mortgage credits in foreign currency have become very expensive in the past few years. For this reason, the Polish government now tries to launch a package for converting these burdening credits in foreign currency into stable zloty loans. However, his transmission will not be easy – and very costly, too.

The question remains: Will banks – and even central banks – ever learn?

Hubert Fromlet
Senior Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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