China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

Poland’s move from an emerging to an emerged “top 20” country – a genuine success story

April 8, 2026

Many international analysts seem to be surprised by the economic rise of Poland during the past 35 years. But they should not. Poland’s positive way forward was clearly visible during all these years. Sure, there were years when less promising steps were made – to the right or to the left – and when the speed of reforms was lowered. However, Poland never left the road of economic reforms. This fact explains very well its rise to the 20th largest economy in the world, passing by even Switzerland.

Very weak starting point in 1990 – but clear strategy to move forward

The planned economy in Poland fell during my time as a chief economist at a major Swedish bank. Contrary to many colleagues, I became very curious about the economic potential of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe despite their weak starting position, particularly when it came to Poland and the Baltic states. In the early 1990s, my written pieces on the enormous potential of Poland were not yet published digitally but I found an internet source in Swedish from 2007 (https://www.varldenidag.se/nyheter/sverige-ar-fortfarande-i-en-tillvaxtekonomi/35348)

Anyway, the very beginning of Poland’s transformation into a market economy and other competitive structures were not easy to accomplish because of all the economic and institutional shortcomings from the planned economy. However, I always got the impression during my frequent visits to Warsaw and the meetings with Polish ministers, central bank governors and colleagues there that Poland persued a clear strategy of steadily moving forward and becoming more competitive in the increasingly globalizing economy. The strong ambition of steadily improving institutional standards played obviously a decisive role in Poland’s successful catching-up process.

Striking major achievements

In 1990, the Polish GDP per capita amounted to modest USD 6 700 or 38 percent of EU average and 35 years later to more than 55 000 or 85 percent of EU average. According to the IMF, Poland reached in 2025 the number 20 position when calculating total GDP. This is indeed a remarkable achievement and has been widely appreciated in global media.

A decisive contribution to this amazing development came without doubt from Poland’s preparations for its EU entry in 2004 and for the continuous institutional commitments after having managed EU membership. Major investments in higher education and modern technology – and, thus a competent labor force – explain as well why Poland could perform so positively in the past few decades. Considerable investment funding by the EU was certain also responsible for Poland’s positive development during the past 20 years.

It can be summarized that Poland achieved an annual GDP-growth rate of almost 4 percent in the past 20 years, clearly above EU average. In 2025, Polish GDP growth was 3.6 percent for the year as a whole and 4 percent for Q4.

Conclusion: The Polish example manifests clearly the decisive role of lasting institutional improvements for the catching-up development of an emerging market. Today, Poland can be described as an emerged country with nowadays good OECD standards, competitiveness and growth potential.

But also Poland must work on continuous stabilization and improvements of its political and economic conditions. Or as Nobel Price winner Paul Samuelson once told me that “globalization does not give time for comfortable ineffectiveness”.

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University

Was the current China crisis predictable?

October 13, 2023

Presentation by Hubert Fromlet, Linnaeus University (Linnéuniversitetet), at the Baltic Sea Region/Emerging Markets and China Seminar 2023 in Kalmar


The Chinese economy develops currently very disappointingly. Market expectations from earlier this year were obviously not met – and certainly not positive expectations from earlier years either.

The following question remains interesting: Was the current economic crisis predictable? The answer should be – “yes indeed”.

Too little profound analysis in time

China became the number 1 exporting nation in 2009 and the number 1 total GDP nation in 2016 (in PPP terms). Thus, there were many years to increase knowledge about China. However, foreign (Western) analytical curiosity about the Chinese economic system remained by far too limited ever since the beginning of China’s era as an economic superpower. In many cases, final enlightenment happened as late as in 2022 during the Chinese covid-19 disaster or only this year caused by the serious real estate crisis.

Since the millennium change, I have singled out four kinds of foreign China analysts. They are

¤ specialized researchers at universities and institutes with focus on China,

¤ full-time and part-time China journalists at home or with location in China,

¤ politicians and ambassadors with long-time experience from China,

¤ analysts on global financial markets and forecasters without special analytical skills and focus on China.

Considering these four groups, it seems to be clear that there has been a number of experts indeed well understanding the forthcoming problems in the Chinese economy – but not so many people could be counted. This implies that financial markets – generally expressed – during many years have been standing for the lion share of the foreign interpretation of the Chinese economy; unfortunately, naively based on (wrong) Chinese statistics and the neglect of poor transparency. However, a positive change may be started in the foreseeable future – hopefully giving us conditions for better China analysis also on a global scale.

The visible and neglected warnings signals

One of the main difficulties for economists or other risk managers is the question about the timing of possibly bursting (financial) bubbles or the misery of other serious accidents. This is mostly impossible since aggravating developments usually happen “step by step”. However, “step by step” or gradually should not make managers to forget about a quite early stressed problem or risk. Let’s now turn to some recognizable early warning signals (which may have been given as much as 15-20 years ago):

Warning signals for China’s economy in the past decade   

About bad transparency:

Bernanke/Olson, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-transparency-challenges/

Fromlet, 2013, https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banks/debt-management/2254223/bank-of-finland-highlights-astonishing-lack-of-information-on-chinese-government-debt

Comment: Persistent bad transparency impacts negatively on potential growth.

About poor statistical standards

Ravallion/Jalan, 1999, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.89.2.301

Fromlet, 2013, see above

Comment: Statistical shortcomings could/can be found when it comes, for example, to GDP, (youth) unemployment, inflation, government debt and particularly local debt, housing market, bad loans of the banks, subsidies, government support of state-owned companies etc. These shortcomings make economic policy too difficult.

About previous and the current real estate crises

Lu Gao (ADB), 2010, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28408/economics-wp198.pdf

Fromlet, 2014, https://publications.bof.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/44826/bpb1514[1].pdf?sequence=1

Comment: Developments on Chinese housing and commercial real estate markets should permanently be watched very closely since these two sectors mean so much to the whole economy.

About banks and financial markets

Poon/Wu/Ahmad, 2023, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/chinese-banks-enter-2023-in-worse-shape-than-global-peers-more-risks-ahead-73464612#:~:text=Collateral%20risk&text=Credit%20losses%20for%20Chinese%20banks,report%20from%20S%26P%20Global%20Ratings.

Fromlet, 2001, https://gmdconsulting.eu/nykerk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Behavioral-Finance-_-theory-and-application.pdf

Comment: Financial risks will remain a top issue for China analysis in the foreseeable future – also in a psychological respect.

About political developments

McBride/Chatzky, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade

Fromlet, 2017 (October 26), https://blogg.lnu.se/china-research/?cat=13398&paged=34

Comment: Politics and the economy belong together, particularly in a country like China.

 

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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Tough discussions in Germany on Chinese FDI

October 31, 2022

Germany is the largest economy in Europe and the EU. For this reason, the recently intensified German debate about the planned Chinese FDI in the harbor of Hamburg looks both interesting and dramatic. Fundamentally, the real reason for this domestic political conflict is mainly about Germany’s future political and economic dependence on China.

The original plan was to allow the Chinese shipping company COSCO to purchase 35 percent of one of the terminals named Tollerort. However, even within the German government a lot of opposition was raised against the planned Chinese harbor deal, particularly by the Greens – thus also criticizing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz who initially supported the 35-percent deal. Finally, the government agreed with a compromise to allow a Chinese participation of 24.9 percent – i.e. an enforced change from a strategic investment in line with the BRI-plans to a financial investment. (BRI means Belt and Road Initiative, see my article in Swedish in Ekonomisk Debatt https://www.nationalekonomi.se/sites/default/files/2022/08/50-5-hf.pdf).

After dependence on Russia a heavier dependence on China?

In the past few months, former German governments and top politicians have been sharply criticized for their contributions to the burdening gas dependence on Russia. This political failure explains very well German fears of a future, even more challenging dependence on China. Maybe, the German concerns have been enlarged further by the latest political powerful political manifestations at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress.

It should be added that Germany’s dependence on China already now appears purely economically much larger than it ever has been on Russia – i.e. the Russian war consequences excluded. Two important questions show up in this context:

¤ Will other European countries join German skepticism against Chinese outbound FDI?

¤ Will European companies voluntarily re-consider their (planned) FDI strategy in China?

We will see. Obviously, German Chancellor Scholz does not want to close the door to China completely at this point. This week he will visit China together with a delegation of German business leaders.

 

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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