China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

Trump’s tariffs weaken Asian growth

October 3, 2025

It is not a new analytical conclusion that the absurd tariffs of President Trump also damage emerging markets though with different intensity from country to country. This harming American policy certainly also affects Asian countries which recently has been confirmed by the updated forecast of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The weakening outlook for the Asian member countries of the ADB also means a limited setback for Western corporations in their attempt to diversify their export markets as a reaction on the deteriorating conditions on U.S. markets. However, Asian growth performance will remain superior to the rest of the world.

Negative growth effects from tariffs but partly offset by domestic policy

ADB summarizes its revised forecast from September 2025 as follows: “Developing Asia’s growth forecasts are trimmed to 4.8% in 2025 and 4.5% in 2026, down by 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points from April. The revisions reflect offsetting factors. The updated trade agreements and tariffs led to a broad shift toward higher US tariffs, which will weigh on the region’s exports and growth. However, fiscal and monetary policy responses are expected to cushion the impact…” (see https://www.adb.org/outlook/editions/september-2025).

It also should be observed that China still has not achieved a deal with the Trump administration. This means a major shortcoming or uncertainty in the ADB forecast -despite the fact that many Asian countries indeed have a trade agreement with the U.S. since August 1. But who knows which trade deal can be regarded as stable?

As far as China is concerned, the ADB explains that GDP forecasts for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been kept unchanged due to domestic growth support. At the same time, the ADB still mentions concerns about China’s “continued weakness in the property market”. My own interpretation of the ADB view on the PRC means continuing concerns, reflected by the decelerating GDP-growth forecasts for 2025 and 2026 (4.7 and 4.3 percent).

India has to accept some downward revision of its growth as well but remains the fastest (major) economy in Asia (expected GDP growth: 6.5 percent in both 2025 and 2026).

Unfortunately, South East Asia will have to face the most negative growth impact in 2026 from Trump’s trade restrictions. Indonesia (GDP +5.0 in the September forecast for 2026, down from +5.1 percent in April)is still considered to remain on track – but countries such as the Philippines (to +5.7 from +6.1 percent), Thailand (to +1.6 from +2.9 percent), Vietnam (to +6.0 from +6.5 percent) and Malaysia (to +4.2 from 4.8 percent) lose quite some momentum – mainly due to American tariffs.

Conclusion: American protectionism certainly affects Asia negatively as a whole – but certain countries more than others. However, altogether Asia will most probably remain the fastest growing region or continent also in the future – as a message to the corporate sector, at least as long as China can avoid a (financial) meltdown.

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University

President Trump’s trade policy – bad news for lagging (emerging) countries

April 25, 2025

The whole world has learned in the past few weeks that American President Donald Trump does not understand cross-border trade policy – or does not want to understand it. More or less all experts inside and outside the U.S. have accused him of neglecting the most obvious advantage of free trade and the disadvantages of protectionism and raising tariffs on such a broad global scale.
What should be discussed more in our part of the world are the bad consequences that affect many of the emerging and less developed countries by all the single bilateral trade accords the U.S. wants to achieve, primarily with strategically important trading partners such as India and possibly also China.

Bilateral trade deals have a lot of disadvantages
We know from reality that there exist both bilateral and multilateral trade agreements which should not be equalized with more ambitious pure free trade agreements. Let’s begin by discussing somewhat what bilateral trade agreements are about – the kind of trade agreement that President Trump and his administration clearly prefer. This was – by the way – obvious already in February 2017 (https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-will-trumps-embrace-of-bilateralism-mean-for-americas-trade-partners/).

We know that it is not difficult to recognize that a bilateral trade agreement practically uses to be easier and faster to achieve than a multilateral one. The main reason for this is that bilateral negotiations only have two sides, in our already mentioned case, for example, the U.S. and India. Multilateral trade negotiations with several or many involved countries on the other hand can take years or even decades. However, multilateral trade agreements can create a larger harmonized market than bilateral trade agreements, provide connected countries with more competition and innovative power plus, consequently, lower prices. They can also help to resolve trade disputes via the currently disarmed WTO and promote cooperation and stability among countries.

In my view, the time-limited duration of bilateral trade negotiations compared to multilateral trade talks manifests itself as the major advantage that this option of trade negotiation usually enjoys. Otherwise, quite a number of disadvantages can be found.
Among the countries that initially are particularly affected by Trump’s tariffs are, for example, China, Lesotho, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Syria, Botswana, Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia, Angola, South Africa, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, etc (see https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-reciprocal-tariffs-liberation-day-list/).
Many other emerging and less advanced countries could be quoted as well, spread all over the globe – countries that are strongly hit by the irresponsible Trump tariffs. Consequently, it cannot be regarded as a surprise that that more than 50 affected countries already a few days after the so-called “Liberation day” on April 2 had announced – according to Trump advisers – that they wanted to negotiate over the import taxes they have been confronted with (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-advisers-say-more-than-50-countries-have-reached-out-for-tariff-talks-with-white-house). Other sources speak currently about stronger interest from even more countries (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-tariff-trade-deal-countries-b2737526.html). We know that it will be bilateral negotiations accordingly.

Bilateral trade negotiations for so many countries mean by definition that different results will come out for the participating countries – leading to further injustice between suffering countries. Different results are logical because of the fact that bilateral trade negotiations have no underlying support by the WTO. This means also that more and more bilateral trade agreements tend to hollow out the position of the WTO – very much at the expense of outsiders among emerging and less developed countries. From this point of view, multilateral agreements are more beneficial to developing countries than bilateral ones because the included countries become more competitive as a group.
In general terms, larger corporations are supposed to benefit the most from bilateral trade agreements because they usually have bigger resources for different competition-improving activities than smaller and medium-sized companies.

Conclusion – disparities may increase, also geographically
Altogether, analysts should be cautious about positive trade interpretations after the ongoing or forthcoming bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and a significant number of emerging and less developed countries, particularly since the results may differ substantially between non-OECD countries both in trade details and geographically. It should be a good idea to look deeper into the negotiated trade deals between the U.S. and the tariff-affected countries – and what they really mean to them.

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University

Emerging markets and a strong dollar

May 27, 2024

Emerging markets are usually more sensitive to weak current account balances than advanced countries. A deficit in the balance on current account urges for a currency inflow since it implies a debt for imports vis-a-vis other countries that has to be paid. This inflow can be done in the three following ways:

¤ by receiving currency reserves via foreign direct investment (which often does not work as an available or sufficient financial source),

¤ by borrowing money in foreign currency (mostly in U.S. dollar, USD), or

¤ by selling stocks, bonds, etc to foreign investors (if such financial products exist in the emerging country and foreign demand for these papers is there).

Statistics show that emerging markets borrow the lion share of their foreign credits in USD which may be challenging in times when the American dollar is strong on global currency markets. This is actually the case. Serving existing debt in USD uses to be even much more challenging.

By the way: During a meeting the other day with American financial analysts, I heard the view that the USD historically tended to be strong when investments in research and development (R&D) in the U.S. were high. This is explained by an increasing demand for American technology stocks and also foreign action for FDI in the U.S., thus leading to a high demand for the dollar and therefore to the strengthening of the American currency. I am not quite sure about the general validity of this suggested correlation. But it can be observed that such conditions can be found these days.

Back to emerging markets. What we can see today is an increasing willingness of certain emerging markets to avoid or decrease new borrowing in USD. However, this is not easy to achieve since USD markets function by far as the biggest global supplier of new loans, also to emerging markets. 

The ongoing situation with the strong dollar is, of course, particularly difficult for emerging countries with high indebtedness in USD. Such countries may be found in all continents – countries that are or have been reporting growing pressure on their currencies in 2024 such as the Nigerian Naira, the Egyptian Pound, the Turkish Lira, the Indonesian rupee, the Argentine peso or the Brazilian real (watch for this the following IMF table: https://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/e2?m=USD). Of course, some of these and other weak currencies of emerging markets have also been impacted by other negative factors than the strong dollar, for example domestic political ones.

At the same time, there are also countries trying to reduce their exposure to the dollar (which also can be seen in the IMF table quoted above). Indonesia is such an example. However, such a trend will not be easy to achieve – but Thailand actually managed it in the past few decades. Perhaps another option may gain momentum as it is currently the case in South East Asia, i.e. trying to expand borrowing within the region at the expense of the USD.  

Conclusion: Analysts of emerging markets should watch the further development of the USD and its impact on indepted emerging markets.

Hubert Fromlet Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
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