China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

China’s short- and long-term strategies – increasing challenges for the West

February 17, 2023

In some of my recent blogs, I paid attention to China’s changing style in international relations. Or should I say President Xi Jinping’s style? It becomes more and more obvious that China has strong political and economic ambitions, also globally. This may mean that even more focus will be put on Taiwan which is increasingly developing as an important U.S. issue – both politically and economically. It is therefore necessary that also the EU – and when possible and necessary Sweden itself – accelerate the formulation of a concrete China strategy. The U.S. has already come considerably longer in this respect – with no major difference between Trump and Biden.

The new – or changing – China

Readers of this blog may have observed that I in recent articles several times have described Chinese attitude and strategy changes that started a couple of years ago, from internationally having been a relatively humble and business-minded country to nowadays presenting itself as self-confident, tougher and less compromising.

Today, China wants to export its “superiority regime model” as much as possible to the rest of the world, particularly to Africa, South America and some countries in South East Europa. China has already gained quite some influence in these continents and regions, also by granting – often expensive – new loans for infrastructure etc.

Altogether, China has become much more ideological, authoritarian and nationalist.

This change can be directly explained by the modified leadership of President Xi Jinping who in the past ten years replaced some kind of the previously collective leadership within the Standing Committee by giving substantially more power to himself. In 2013, the first year of Xi in office, the objectives by the Third Plenum with many plans – also for Westerners – toward more market economy looked quite promising. This allowed then for some cautious optimism about future economic progress – cautious optimism that, however, in the meanwhile to a high extent has been shattered.

Thus, economic policy has been landing on the wrong gangway after 2013 – not easy or even impossible to reverse in the forthcoming years or even decades. “Decades” could be the right term when including the Taiwan issue. In my view, Taiwan has to be regarded as the most complicated political and economic issue of the future for both China and the U.S. – with a lot of potential for escalating conflicts between both countries.

Taiwan – a complicated issue for the whole world

Taiwan is very special for both Mainland China and the U.S. Both countries may at some point find a reason to start a war. The official China wants Taiwan back and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve reunification -but without mentioning a certain year. Some analysts see 2049 – the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China – as a possible year of confrontation, others predict 2035 when China is expecting to achieve “the status of a moderately prosperous country”. Certain China experts are even of the opinion that the price for an invasion including far-reaching Western sanctions would be too large for China – both what concerns Chinese exports and imports.

On the other hand, the belief that the U.S. most probably would not accept a Chinese invasion of Taiwan seems to be widely spread among Western analysts. One can hardly imagine what such a development would mean to the global economy.

Taiwan receives American support not only for democracy reasons but also for its close link to high-tech software. 65 percent of all semiconductors and 90 percent of all advanced chips in the world are produced in Taiwan which currently does not leave much space to Mainland China, the EU and the U.S. Having pointed at this fact, nobody should be surprised that China, the EU and the U.S. now eagerly aim at visibly enlarge their own production of intermediate IT-products at home. Infineon’s planned chip investment in Dresden is such an example.

Political priorities

Before Xi’s entry into the highest political positions, strategic foreign policy was not really an important issue for China’s political leaders. Most issues dealt with trade policy and international business relations. Now, foreign policy is judged as very important since President Xi wants to see China as the most influential country in the world.

The revival of active foreign policy means all the same that China also applies strategic policy objectives at home with new policy tools that have been explained above. New domestic policy tools and objectives are indeed badly needed for Chinese leaders in order to divert the people from the disappointing economic performance – divert by using an ideological, authoritarian and nationalist stance in communication with the Chinese people.

Conclusion:
The analysis of China is about to become increasingly difficult – particularly when including the Taiwan issue. It is quite new in a way that China and President Xi want to become more powerful in a global perspective, not only at home by the authoritarian and nationalist leadership style. Western companies should observe these ongoing changes of Chinese political leadership.

 

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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China’s corona conundrum

December 15, 2022

What we do know is that fact that corona also reached China from the very beginning. Certain people claim that that corona originates in Wuhan at a laboratory. This, however, nobody knows for sure. Anyway, the first infection cases happened in China. We also know that Chinese political leaders recently changed their policy stance in the fight against corona – from very restrictive to clearly less restrictive. But which were the real driving forces behind these changes?

Management by fear

China was the first country to be confronted with the covid virus roughly three years ago. China also acted as the first country to impose drastic restrictions to stop the disease. This was understandable as big concerns about major contagion already existed directly after the eruption of the crisis.

The objective of control and maximum battle against covid-19 (zero-covid strategy) was close to recently to reduce virus contagion down to almost zero and finally eliminate the virus. But fear remained around all the time and continues to do so – not very strange when considering the population of 1400 million people and the enormous potential of contagion. Consequently, management by (feeling) fear continued – provided with the frequent official political remark that the zero-covid strategy has kept Chinese corona contagions and deaths low when comparing with Western countries. Rumors say that President Xi Jinping himself persistently commanded the application of the zero-covid strategy.

But also transparency so far remained low during the corona crisis. Since I for a long time have been analyzing that the quality of economic statistics was quite limited in China, I applied this questioning experience also to the statistical interpretation of covid infections – right or wrong. I suspect that published corona statistics showed much lower numbers than reality would have shown. Statistical transparency remains by far too low.

Strict restrictions with more and more lockdowns went on for quite some time but citizens finally became impatient and started this fall their protests and even demonstrations. Political leadership continued management by (feeling) fear for a while. Only recently, however, a far-reaching easening of the corona restrictions was introduced allowing more mobility and less control – again driven by management of (feeling) fear. This time probably by fear of social unrest, since the corona situation only a few days before the corona deregulations was worsening. An enormous swing!

What now?

The comprehensive abolition of many covid restrictions in the beginning of December this year seems to be risky. Everything happened so suddenly and quickly. Chinese institutions had no time to prepare. The omicron virus was suddenly explained as quite harmless – opposite to official comments only the week before.

Now, an obvious risk for the future is a fast acceleration of new corona infections and exhausted hospital resources. Such developments could also counteract a visible economic recovery which the whole world is waiting for.

On the other hand, the big future opportunity in the short run may be a beneficiary widening of the Chinese labor force and, thus, more potential for production – particularly if China politically starts to lean a little bit more to the West again.

Summary: China’s corona conundrum remains puzzling. Corona is not dead!

 

I send all readers my best seasonal greetings and a Happy New Year with at least some economic recovery.

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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Tough discussions in Germany on Chinese FDI

October 31, 2022

Germany is the largest economy in Europe and the EU. For this reason, the recently intensified German debate about the planned Chinese FDI in the harbor of Hamburg looks both interesting and dramatic. Fundamentally, the real reason for this domestic political conflict is mainly about Germany’s future political and economic dependence on China.

The original plan was to allow the Chinese shipping company COSCO to purchase 35 percent of one of the terminals named Tollerort. However, even within the German government a lot of opposition was raised against the planned Chinese harbor deal, particularly by the Greens – thus also criticizing German Chancellor Olaf Scholz who initially supported the 35-percent deal. Finally, the government agreed with a compromise to allow a Chinese participation of 24.9 percent – i.e. an enforced change from a strategic investment in line with the BRI-plans to a financial investment. (BRI means Belt and Road Initiative, see my article in Swedish in Ekonomisk Debatt https://www.nationalekonomi.se/sites/default/files/2022/08/50-5-hf.pdf).

After dependence on Russia a heavier dependence on China?

In the past few months, former German governments and top politicians have been sharply criticized for their contributions to the burdening gas dependence on Russia. This political failure explains very well German fears of a future, even more challenging dependence on China. Maybe, the German concerns have been enlarged further by the latest political powerful political manifestations at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress.

It should be added that Germany’s dependence on China already now appears purely economically much larger than it ever has been on Russia – i.e. the Russian war consequences excluded. Two important questions show up in this context:

¤ Will other European countries join German skepticism against Chinese outbound FDI?

¤ Will European companies voluntarily re-consider their (planned) FDI strategy in China?

We will see. Obviously, German Chancellor Scholz does not want to close the door to China completely at this point. This week he will visit China together with a delegation of German business leaders.

 

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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