China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

The AIIB and How Not To Repeat Historical Mistakes

May 6, 2015

Old hero looks on bad temperedly as would-be new hero launches his idea for a new global financial order. Old hero tries for all he is worth to prevent the new idea from gaining currency among his erstwhile followers. His efforts are to no avail. The new hero manages to amass overwhelming support for his proposed institution.

Ah you might well say. This is all about the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, new hero being China and old hero being the USA. Right? Yes indeed. But there is actually another answer which could be considered equally as correct. It is the case of the creation of the IMF. On that occasion the new hero was the US with the UK being the grudging old hero. At that point, not even an alternative idea put forward by none other than John Maynard Keynes was able to prevent the dollar based international structure from being born.

The IMF was created in 1945. And now it is 2015. 70 years is a long time in economics, perhaps. Yet surely not that long for the American memory not to be stirred and to recognise the irony of the turn of events. Well may be not. But it is certainly an indication that people react in pretty much the same fashion when the same kind of shock hits them.

That said it is difficult to envisage the renminbi acquiring the position that the US dollar did in the immediate postwar years. In passing, it should also be noted that the US dollar’s reign itself did not last that very long. The dollar’s convertibility to gold was terminated in 1971 after all, thereby effectively ending the dollar’s position as unchallenged international key currency. Nevertheless the Chinese currency is even more disadvantaged than the dollar of those days in that China’s economic supremacy of today is nowhere near that of the US in the immediate postwar years. At that point, everyone else was struggling with postwar redevelopment. They desperately needed dollars to finance that endeavour. The renminbi is so clearly not in that position.

In Japan we have the saying “acorns comparing heights” indicating competition among contestants who are not that different from each other in terms of ability. There is no outstanding winner with undisputed might. This is very much the case now that we live in a highly globalised world in which people, goods and money flow so effortlessly over borders. No single nation or region can boast of being the oak tree rather than an acorn. China may be an extremely super large acorn but it remains an acorn nonetheless and not the tree.

Moreover, the dollar of pre-1971 years was the only currency that was convertible to gold at a fixed price. The renminbi enjoys no such exceptionality.

All this being said, one can understand China’s motivations behind the AIIB initiative quite well. It needs access to the infrastructure development market of Asia. In needs some big projects on which it can use up its vast excess production capacity. Having run out of investment opportunities inside its own economy, it is now looking for space elsewhere. It is also looking for a way out of dollar-dependency. It wants access to global finance in its own right without having to rely on the dollar as a gateway.

So the new kid on the block is trying to grow up in a workable fashion. The US should look back on its experience of 70 years ago and try to avoid the British mistake of attempting to block the newcomer’s way. Begrudging new people access to club membership is never a very sophisticated thing to do. They will sulk, become defiant and go on to create a club of their own. This will more often than not lead to unproductive squabbles and pitch warfare.

It was refreshing to watch the British manoeuvre on this occasion. To be the first to stand up and be counted as a member of the AIIB club was a stroke of piratical genius. It seems that the country’s buccaneer spirits have not died down completely. A completely different performance to 70 years ago. Much more sensible. It is a typical case in point which shows you that when you are no longer the old hero whose position is being threatened by youthful rivals you can relax and come up with some impish ideas about position taking.

Most pitiful in this context has been Japan’s response to the AIIB idea. It would have done better to try to outdo the British. If a young and upcoming very large Asian acorn is trying to boost infrastructure development in the area, a more mature and more experienced Asian acorn of not at all negligible size should welcome the opportunity to lend a hand. Or even both hands. Having secured the position of wise old advisor, Japan could have gone on to mediate between old hero and new hero. Alas no such luck. Japan just keeps looking on with scared stiff eyes for the new comer and apologetic diffidence for the old timer. Pathetic.

 

 

 

 

 

Noriko Hama
Professor & Dean at Doshisha Business School, Kyoto

 

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Survey on China’s new economic and social reform policies

April 2015

1. Do you think that the main economic and social reforms that were set up by China’s political leaders at the Third Plenum in November 2013 can be implemented roughly successfully by 2020 – the officially announced evaluation year?

Yes: 54 % No: 46 %

2. Which three envisaged areas will be the most difficult ones to reform (ranked)?

Financial markets

Institutions

Environment

3. Where do you see the three major challenges to the reform policy come from (ranked)?

Politics

Slow moves of institutions

Lack of understanding through the whole system of decisions makers

4. Considering your answers above on the importance of better quality of growth – as stressed repeatedly by the government – what kind of GDP effects do you expect in the forthcoming years

GDP-growth rates will improve until 2020
compared to current growth rates –

GDP-growth rates will stabilize at a level
of 6-7% in the years to 2020 73 %

GDP-growth rates will decline considerably
until 2020 compared to current growth rates 27 %

The quality of data will in the forthcoming years

improve: 27 % deteriorate: 9 % remain unchanged: 64 %

The transparency of data will improve

Yes: 45 % No: 55 %

5. As how important would you grade a relatively successful Chinese reform policy by 2020 for the

(scale 1-5; 5 = very important)

European economy (generally): 3.7 European corporate sector: 3.5

American economy (generally): 3.7 American corporate sector: 3.8

Asian economy outside China: 4.8 Asian corporations outside China: 4.7

 

Comments:

The results of our little survey should be interpreted cautiously since only 11 experts sent their answers to us. But we think that some indications are given all the same.

The respondents are really divided on the future results of the reforms plans (as it was the case one year ago).

Not very surprising: Financial markets, institutions and the environment are considered as the most difficult areas to reform or to improve.

More than 70 percent of the panel participants believe that China’s GDP growth rate will stabilize between 6 and 7 percent in the forthcoming years; this would be quite a satisfactory development with (probably) improved quality of growth at the same time. Regrettably, no major progress is expected what concerns the quality of statistics.

A relatively successful Chinese reform policy is regarded as quite important to the European and American economy – but also to the corporate sector of these two continents. In our view, the Chinese impact will be even higher beyond 2020 if Chinese reform policy were to fail. Understandably, the rest of Asia will be even more dependent on developments in China, the panelists conclude.

 

 

Hubert Fromlet
Senior Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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Chinese Patents Gain Momentum – But Still Insufficient Transparency

April 1, 2015

According to the WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) – an agency of the United Nations – China was ranked in 2014 as the number three PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty ) application country in the world, summing up its filing to totally 25 539. It should be added that the WIPO totally gathers nearly 190 member states. According to the WIPO’s website, the “PCT assists applicants in seeking patent protection internationally for their inventions … By filing one international patent application under the PCT, applicants can simultaneously seek protection for an invention in 148 countries throughout the world… “

This good Chinese ranking last year gave a global “market” share of almost 12%, after the U.S. (29%) and Japan (20%), and before Germany (somewhat above 8%). The Swedish share turned out to be relatively high (close to 2 %, 3925 applications, no 10 globally) – but 0.7% came alone from Ericsson; the total Swedish market share, however, has been declining somewhat compared to 2013. In the Chinese case, 1.6 % of all global PCT applications could be related to Huawei – the largest patent applier in the world – and 1% to ZTE (both representing the telecom and mobile business).

One may also note that other BRICS countries – if we still use this somewhat obsolete term – so far achieved very modest PCT-applications numbers compared to China’s 25 539 (India 1394, Russia 890, Brazil 581, South Africa 297; see also BOFIT Weekly 13/2015). China is indeed very ambitious when it comes to new technology and new products which I pointed at before a couple of times when discussing the strategic communiqué from the Third Plenum from November 2013 with its 16 chapters and 60 subchapters, many of them shadowing the New Growth Theory created by Paul Romer and consortes (who, by the way, would be a dignified Nobel Prize winner this year).

At the same time, however, one should not neglect that China’s PCT application numbers are misleading to some extent, even if it is hard to be more precise on what “to some extent” means in reality. We know that a substantial share of the Chinese applications do not stick to what can be called inventions in a real innovative sense. People I have been talking to have “guestimates” that only around one fourth or so of all Chinese PCT applications were justified from a strict innovative angle – but the same experts pointed also at the obvious fast upturn of genuine new Chinese patents and some slight general improvement of the enforcement of the Chinese patent law (see on this issue Ying Zhan, “Problems of Enforcement of Patent Law in China and its Ongoing Fourth Amendment”, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, July 2014). In this context, Ying Zhan stresses the view that the Intellectual Property Right (IPR) system is a “Western imported system that takes more time to root in China”.

Altogether, there is no doubt that China is an increasingly important player on the global patent market – also what concerns the number and market share of technologically advanced innovations. But I would appreciate more transparency in this respect – and more and better research in this specific issue. Well-working patents are an important part of a promising innovation climate – and a promising and further improved innovation climate must be regarded as one of the decisive cornerstones of China’s new, future-oriented growth policy.

We should follow these trends that probably will affect us more than most of us imagine today.

 

 

Hubert Fromlet
Senior Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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