China Research

China’s housing market is turning the corner. Sales have risen, inventories are coming down, and prices have firmed slightly in many cities. Slow new house-building will remain a drag on the economy for some time yet, but should begin to add to GDP growth in 2013. The key drivers of the turnaround are greater affordability and an easing of financing constraints.

Divining the state of China’s housing market is not easy. China has 16 cities or conurbations with a population over 5mn and a further 20 with populations over 3mn, and conditions vary. What is happening in Shanghai and Beijing in the luxury sector does not necessarily represent what is happening elsewhere. Official data on housing is improving, but remains limited and, as with all China’s data, sometimes misleading.

To supplement the available data, at Standard Chartered we have conducted a regular survey of thirty developers in eight Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, with populations from 3-8mn. Our most recent survey confirmed official data suggesting that the market is improving. Developers are seeing more sales and are beginning to plan increased construction.

Owning property is a powerful ambition in China. For many men it is a pre-requisite for finding a wife given the gender disparity and cultural expectations for a dowry from the male side. And despite the building boom, the vast majority of people in China have still not made the move to a modern apartment block, but would dearly love to. There is a huge underlying demand that is rising with continued urbanisation, and is set to remain rapid for a few more years before levelling off.

China’s housing market is also widely used for investment. Opportunities to earn higher returns on savings have improved for wealthy investors in recent years, with the rapid growth of trust companies. But the stock market is languishing at low levels, so property is the preferred asset class for many.

New apartments in China are typically sold unfinished, with internal walls and electric outlets, but not doors, floor coverings, kitchens or bathrooms. Investors generally leave them unfinished. Buyers in China have a strong preference for new apartments and any chosen kitchen or bathroom might be unfashionable a few years later.

This is a key reason for the frequent observation of empty apartments; usually they are sold, but just left empty. These apartments are effectively treated like a land investment, rather than as an income-generating asset. One implication is that a property investment boom in China does not necessarily reduce rents as it might in the West, which slows any natural rebalancing.

Large investor holdings could be a problem if everyone tried to sell at the same time. But there has been limited distress among owners in this housing cycle because loan-to-value ratios are generally low and many investors have no mortgage at all. They can afford to wait it out.

The spurt in home completions in late 2011 on projects started during the post-2009 bubble phase is slowing, while the amount of floor-space under construction is deep in negative territory. Meanwhile our survey finds buyers returning, attracted by lower prices and local easing in financing conditions. Over time these trends will bring down unsold inventories, which are still high.

I say “local” because the central government has resisted easing up on the housing sector. It is afraid of a sudden return to bubble conditions, particularly given the easing in monetary policy generally to combat the economic downturn. Some cities that tried to loosen regulations too much have apparently been over-ruled. But overall, the evidence is that it has become somewhat easier to get finance than a year ago, at least for owner-occupiers.

Prices seem to have fallen in the range of 5-20%, with a greater fall in new-build than in the secondary market, as is typical after a boom. This may not sound like much, but wages are growing 15-20% in many cities. Encouraging wage growth is a deliberate part of the government’s strategy for boosting consumption, but it also means that housing affordability has considerably improved over the last two years.

Price is the key issue. While prices in Shanghai and Beijing often look breath-takingly high, arguably this reflects their “world city” status. In ordinary cities, prices were also becoming high relative to earnings a couple of years ago, sparking social discontent. The signs are that the slowdown over the last couple of years has corrected this, to some degree. But it would not take much to open up a gap again. Hence the government focus on restricting investors, by limiting people to one property only, while encouraging first-time buyers. As the market recovers, expect an increased focus on ways to prevent prices rising too fast, including property taxes and financing restrictions.

John Calverley
Head of Macroeconomic Research, Standard Chartered Bank, Toronto

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When I visited China in early May this year, I really got the impression that China was strongly interested in a European recovery as soon as possible. China cares about the EU and EMU – probably mostly for its own sake (which is a normal emphasis and reaction). This includes that China really wants to have a strong economic counterpart to the U.S. in the Western hemisphere – and that it has been investing a lot of money in the Euro since its start.

China’s worries about the economic development of the EU/EMU have been confirmed in recent months statistically, too. Chinese exports have slowed down visibly – particularly what concerns exports to Europe. And the problems that are linked to the crises in mainly Southern Europe have not declined either since spring.

Chinese GDP is now growing slightly below expectations (q2: 7.6 %). This causes concerns since the current president Hu Jintao and prime minister Wen Jiabao certainly do not want to leave the economy to the next generation of political leaders in a worrisome shape. The situation in Europe contributes substantially to the worries.

It is not very common that the Chinese give policy advice to leaders of other countries when they visit China. For this reason, it was quite illuminating that prime minister Wen Jiabao recently explained to the German chancellor Merkel that countries in certain situations cannot solely concentrate on structural fiscal recovery – but also have to rely on traditional Keynesian policy if economic growth is fading too much.

Wen mentioned that China has been very successful in this respect. To some extent, he may be right (at least without regarding the risk of overinvestment). But what China neglects is the point that China has not deregulated cross-border financial flows like the affected EMU countries have – and, consequently, cannot be hit sharply by global speculation. Furthermore, China had – and still has – the advantage of a positive current account balance. This means there is no real need of net borrowing abroad. In other words: Conditions for Chinese expansionary fiscal policy are very different from conditions in Southern Europe (apart from the non-transparent issue of the real size of the Chinese government debt).

Another reason why China is very unhappy about the European debt crisis is of a more financial nature, i.e. the capital losses that derive from the weakening Euro. China wants to diversify its currency reserves from the U.S. dollar to a higher of the Euro. Currently, however, such a strategy is counteracted by the weakening Euro. Despite the ongoing challenges, however, China still invests in the Euro (example: according to the statistics of the EFSF, around 14 % of its funding comes from Asia, Japan excluded, which should be about Euro 5-6 billion of Chinese origin – which on the other hand is not an amount that is really supportive to the Euro).

Altogether: China cares a lot about Europe, the EU and the Euro. But there is not very much China can do or will do to dampen the European crisis more significantly.

Hubert Fromlet
Professor of International Economics
Editorial board

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This is astonishing since the Chinese economy has by now climbed to the second position in global GDP ranking (total, in PPP terms). Thus, the development of China’s government debt matters increasingly to Europe as well, both in a macroeconomic and an applied corporate perspective.

Furthermore, not enough is known about the real size of the total Chinese government debt. Insufficient statistical transparency is an important reason for this shortcoming, but this should not serve as an excuse. Increasing efforts are needed to provide China and the rest of the world with better information on the real state of Chinese government debt. This need is underlined by a special survey with Linnaeus University’s China Panel in March/April 2012.

In this paper, an attempt is made to explain and discuss/roughly estimate the real situation when it comes to the Chinese government debt. The current Greek debt misery clearly shows that opaque statistics, even in small countries, cannot be hidden away forever without sooner or later puzzling and/or frightening the financial markets. On the other hand, China cannot be analyzed completely with Western eyes.

The sooner decision-makers decide on greater transparency in the total government debt situation, and decisive steps towards more efficient fiscal policy are taken, the better the consequences for China itself and for the European /global economy. The alternative – continuous opaqueness and a possible future fiscal turmoil or explosion -could certainly do a lot of harm to the European and global economy. There is no reason to underestimate this medium and long-term risk coming from government debt. The short-term perspective looks safer.

There should be room for a greater exchange of views and co-operation between EU and China, too. The EU’s own bad experience from the past few years could be arealistic starting point.

JEL Classifications: D 02, D 82, H 70, H 74, O 53, P 35

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Hubert Fromlet
Professor of International Economics
Editorial board

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