China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

The BRICS Turmoil: Reality or Overshooting?

September 4, 2013

During summer, we have seen – and still see – quite some nervousness about the so-called BRIC countries in the emerging world – and some contagion to a couple of emerging market countries that also try to catch up, like Indonesia and Turkey. Three questions seem to be particularly interesting:

¤ Is the current nervousness about BRIC countries really motivated?

¤ Why do we have these contagion effects to several countries – to some extent similar to developments during the Asian crisis of 1997-98?

¤ Do we currently see the beginning of a real BRIC crisis which may turn much worse and which will also mean a notable downsizing of BRICS countries’ potential (trend) growth?

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BRIC is a term that has been coined in the beginning of the past decade by an economist from Goldman Sachs, a major American investment bank. BRIC –nowadays BRICS since South Africa joined the “club” a few years ago – are the initial letters of Brazil, Russia, India and China. I always considered the BRIC(S) thing mainly as a marketing instrument for asset allocation. In reality, these countries did not have enough in common to put all four eggs in one basket. Relatively good economic growth during a couple of years and a large population were simply not enough to “harmonize” analysis and investment strategies for these countries.

By the way, similar simplifications could be recognized already in the latter part of the 1990s when Eastern Europe Equity Funds and Asia Equity Funds were launched as attractive alternatives for investors. At that time, countries with different structural and institutional conditions were put in the same investment baskets, too. This proved to be wrong after some time. BRIC supporters from all over the world could have learnt from these examples.

Many experts see the main reason for the current “BRICS problems” in the expectations of – right or wrong – forthcoming cautiously rising interest rates in the traditional industrial world, especially in the U.S. Such a development could (probably) lead to (further) substantial capital outflows from BRIC countries to North America (the U.S.) and (parts of) Europe, according to the BRICS pessimists.

This explanation, however, is too fluffy. A deeper analysis of the BRICS problems is urgently needed. Are there fundamental reasons for the contagion? Or have we got a new example of overreacting financial markets?    

Let’s first look at possible common characteristics of the four BRIC countries – South Africa is excluded in this context – that may have caused negative feelings about the BRICs as a group.

¤  Portfolio shifts?  More financial inflows to the traditional OECD countries – at the expense of portfolio investments in emerging markets because of expected gradual, cautious monetary tightening by mainly the Fed  (with the assumption that the four above-mentioned, leading emerging markets are running the highest outflow risks)
–> could partly serve as an explanation because the four above-mentioned BRIC countries represent the economically four most important emerging economies.

¤  Substantial slowdown in GDP growth?   A rapid weakening of GDP could actually been noted in only two BRIC countries during the past year – in Russia and in India. Brazil even stands for growth improvements four quarters in a row after a couple of growth stimuli.

The last GDP-growth numbers for the BRIC countries look as follows:

Brazil:    2013, q2: 3.3%;    2012, q2: 0.5%         –> coming down from around 9% in early 2010

Russia:  2013, q2: 1.2%;     2012, q2: 4.3%        –> coming down from roughly 5% in early 2010

India:    2013, q2:  4.4%;    2012, q2: 5.3%         –> compared with about
9% in early 2010

China:   2013, q2:  7.5%;    2012, q2: 7.6           –> compared with about 10% in early 2010

Obviously, GDP growth has not developed simultaneously in all BRIC countries in the past few quarters – but more visibly on trend during the past 3-4 years. This is indeed true for all BRIC countries.  This development strengthens the view that more positive growth signals that currently come from the U.S., Japan and some European countries to a high extent more strongly triggered the worsening cyclical view of financial investors on BRIC countries than any other single factor. But looking at GDP-growth developments since 2010 gives also certain reasons to find structural components in the now more dampened growth outlook for BRIC. Thus, we have
–>  an obvious  cyclical BRIC phenomenon combined with certain negative structural components (like, for example, demand from Southern Europe) – and not a pure structural problem.

¤  Current account problems?   Current account deficits are frequently used explanations for the problems of the BRICs – and the need for foreign capital inflows for financing these deficits. But only India has a (somewhat) too high deficit ratio in relation to GDP (around -4.5-5% in 2013).  Brazil’s predicted deficit in the range of 3 ¼ – 3 ¾ % for 2013 is a little bit high but should not be as scaring as markets consider the entire BRIC situation. China and – probably – Russia should even continuously manage current account surpluses which takes us to the conclusion
-> that current account problems should not really be considered as a major common problem for all the four major BRICS countries. From this point of view, the contagion effects that have been created by global financial markets, seem to be overdone. But they exist!

¤  Insufficient fiscal stability?  Public debt – annual and total – is, of course, an economic indicator that all country analysts watch very carefully. In this respect, Russia and – probably – Brazil seem to have their structural fiscal conditions roughly under control. China seems to be on the safe side for the time being – at least when official numbers are analyzed (about which, unfortunately, one may have serious doubts). India finally has been affected by negative fiscal developments since a long time ago. Thus, the question is
–> why well-known fiscal conditions – which are not really bad in all four BRIC countries – suddenly should lead to general worries on global financial markets. We probably can find psychological explanations in this respect. This urges for deeper analysis.

¤  Lagging structural reforms?  Sure, all emerging countries have more or less burdening structural or fundamental shortcomings. What concerns Brazil, one may mention, for example, insufficient productivity gains and declining international competitiveness, lagging education and pension systems, etc. Furthermore, Brazil is nowadays increasingly competing with – currently – a more reform-minded and economically improving Mexico. Russia suffers from a significant number of institutional deficits – the financial system and support of entrepreneurship included – a too large role for the government/state in the economy and a too high dependence on the energy sector.

India, on the other hand, has more obvious fiscal problems than Brazil, Russia and China and more growth-impeding infrastructural shortcomings which are – also according to my own micro experience from these countries – much more serious than in the three other large emerging countries. The same conclusion can be made about the Indian current account deficit. Last but not least China. Nobody questions that China’s economy has proceeded substantially in the past two decades or so. But we know also that China despite all economic progress still suffers from lots of structural shortcomings particularly when it comes to microeconomic and institutional conditions – unfortunately combined with worrying transparency shortcomings.

Putting together the reflections of the above-mentioned structural thoughts means that structural shortcomings exist in all four  BRIC countries  
–> 
but without strong logical correlation for motivating sudden distortions and disappointment for the BRIC region as a whole as we have seen in the past months.    

Conclusions                                                                 

In my opinion, the recent negative pressure from global financial markets on the artificial BRIC group – South Africa is excluded in this analysis – should not be considered as the result of a completely consistent and logical approach. Several factors point also at psychological overshooting. Common issues for all four BRIC countries are the insufficient demand for their exports, mainly caused by weak global demand – an issue that probably is characterized by both cyclical and structural dimensions – and the expected future monetary tightening in the U.S.

I have also found that several negative macroeconomic indicators do not point at the same degree of imbalance in all four BRIC countries (if at all).Consequently, it can be singled out that certain psychological overreactions are/were in place.

For this reason, I would argue that current developments have re-set the previously overdone BRIC enthusiasm – to some extent the result of artificial financial marketing – to a more justified stance of growth expectations (without considering the issue of the middle-income trap). This should induce some reduction of previously exaggerated expectations of BRIC countries’ potential GDP growth – but probably less dramatically than described in many recent analytical pieces. Again: Almost all countries have their own characteristics. This makes it most doubtful to put several “(emerging) country eggs” in one single analytical basket.

However, occasional negative contagion effects from one country to another will most probably be inevitable in the future as well. Here we have another example that clarifies the need for more research in behavioral finance.

Hubert Fromlet
Visiting Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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India: The Present Economic Outlook

June 7, 2013

In the fiscal year ended March 2013, the Indian economy turned out its weakest economic growth in a long while. The provisional estimates released at the end of May 2013, reported that the economy grew by 5.0 per cent, terribly weak compared to even the crisis year 2008-09, when India managed to close the year with 6.7 per cent growth. An economy of more than 1.2 billion people, the majority of who are poor by any global benchmark and where tens of millions of youngsters are coming out of school and college each year in search for jobs and livelihoods, depressed growth is very bad news. The average annual rate of growth for the eight year period from 2003/04 to 2010/11 was 8.6 per cent. The average over the 20-year period 1992/93 to 2010/11 was 7.0 per cent.

In the two years immediately following the crisis year, namely in 2009/10 and 2010/11, the Indian economy grew by 8.6 and 9.3 per cent respectively. So why did growth slump to 6.2 per cent in 2011/12 and to 5.0 per cent in 2012/13? And what is the near-term outlook and prognosis for growth? Is a revival possible in 2013/14? These are questions that hang like a heavy cloud over both policy makers and economic analysts. For the magnitude of the slump in the second half of 2011/12 to 5.5 per cent was surprising, as was the persistence of slow growth in 2012/13.

Broadly the answer to the question of why the slump happened appears to lie in three separate elements. (1) The first is that the vigour of the recovery from the crisis year was underestimated in the preliminary estimates of economic growth. This led to some delay in adjusting the fiscal and monetary stimulus that had been rolled out to counteract the effects of the crisis in 2008/2009, which in turn allowed inflation to be pushed up to unacceptably high levels. This in conjunction with rising world commodity prices undermined profitability. The impact was compounded by a significant depreciation of the national currency. Companies saw their operating margins decline, and corporate profit growth was weak. (2) Plans for equity infusion had been deferred by many companies as the crisis unfolded. They had kept capital flowing into projects by taking on more leverage than originally envisaged. The shortage of equity has however persisted into present times. This combined with declining profitability has stretched balance sheets painfully. Hardly a condition that is favourable to business expansion and investment. (3) Beginning earlier, but becoming more painful since 2010, projects started to face numerous problems in securing clearances from administrative departments to carry forward their projects. These difficulties were complicated in the context of judicial decisions and guidance in some cases. All of this also had adverse impact on the quality of banking assets, as banks play a big role in funding projects in India.

Aside from soaring inflation, the deterioration of macro-economic conditions stemming from deterioration in fiscal conditions and the external payments situation, together with contentious domestic political climate and high level of rhetoric negatively impacted economic conditions. Compounding this was the malaise in the global economy. The generally depressed state of global business sentiment was reflected in weak business confidence within India.

In many ways this was a perfect storm. So many unrelated problems came together in a short span of a few years. The hubris that unfortunately arose from the successful negotiation of the global economic crisis certainly prepared the ground for a high-impact letdown.

Where do we stand today? The fiscal trajectory has been corrected. Politically difficult decisions in rationalization of fuel prices, re-prioritization of expenditures and some other steps to boost revenue, has seen the fiscal deficit undergo strong correction and in the current year 2013/14 will stick to target. Long-standing decision on permitting foreign direct investment into certain areas and other reforms did not come cheap. An important partner in the ruling coalition left the government in September 2012, and another went in early 2013. However, the government has persisted in the right direction and overall macroeconomic policy has undergone the necessary stabilization.

Important re-jigging of the way clearances are given to projects has been undertaken and a higher powered committee of the Cabinet has facilitated the clearance of a large number of large investment projects. The government is energetically pursuing every opportunity to push for the execution of investment and asset creation in the public sector and to encourage private business to expand and invest. Over time, possibly in the second half of 2013/14, these measures should result in renewed investment activity.

Notwithstanding the sharp decline in growth, investment and savings rates remains favourable. Gross domestic capital formation in 2011/12 and 2012/13 were at 35.5 per cent of GDP in both years. This was lower than what it had been in 2007/08 (38.0 per cent) and in 2010/11 (37.0 per cent), but are still reasonably high. On the basis of historical relationships in India between investment and growth, this level is capable of generating 7 to 8 per cent rates of growth. The proportion of GDP going to create fixed assets (fixed investment rate) was about 30 per cent in both 2011/12 and 2012/13. The domestic savings rate for 2011/12 was nearly 31 per cent and probably close to that in 2012/13. In short, the domestic investment and savings rate are still at levels that can produce much stronger growth than has been evident in both of the two previous fiscal years.

That it has not, is in part, on account of the delays that has inflicted projects in India on account of clearances, fuel availability and other delays. For example, there is at the moment, more than 10,000 megawatts of thermal power plant capacity that is wholly or largely idle on account of non-availability of natural gas and coal. Likewise there are many projects that have got delayed in their path to completion, even as billions of dollars of capital has been invested in them. It is the belief of government that actively pursuing reform in policy and administration and facilitating the completion of such projects, the invested capital will be able to generate considerable incremental current output, that is, economic growth. It is not as if there is no market in India for incremental supply. Indeed the converse is true. The shortage of infrastructure services – electricity, roads and the like – seriously constrain output in India.

The positive developments that have materialized in India over the past year are: (1) Stabilization of a range of macro policies; (2) Restoration of the trajectory towards fiscal consolidation; (3) A decline of wholesale price inflation from double digit levels to about 5 per cent, which is within our comfort zone. Manufacturing output remains depressed as also measures of business confidence. However, there is a strong possibility that hard numbers will begin to show improvements in coming months and that there will be some degree of recovery in the second half of the year, which in turn should lay the foundation for a stronger and more broad-based economic recovery in 2014.
June 4, 2013

 

 

 

 

Saumitra Chaudhuri
Member, Planning Commission & Member Advisory Council to the Prime Minister and the Government of India

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Bank Productivity Changes in two Asian Giants

December 5, 2012

Summary

After centuries of quiescence, the last two decades have witnessed very rapid economic growth in the world’s two most populous countries, China and India. Finance plays a crucial role in growth and in both economies the banks dominate the provision of external finance during the period of studied.

For China bond and equity market capitalisation was 26% and 45% respectively in 2002, compared to 115% and 137% for the US. In India, the comparable figures are 36% and 43%. The main aim of the paper is to look at recent productivity advances in Chinese and Indian banks.

First, this study focuses on trends in total factor productivity (TFP) changes in their banking sectors between 2000 and 2007; annual fluctuations are also examined. Second, the components of TFP growth are analysed, along with variations within and between the two countries, and across banks that differ in size, ownership, and listing characteristics. Third, we assess how closely estimates from non-parametric (Data Envelopment-DEA) and parametric (Stochastic Frontier-SFA) analyses concur and what this implies for their relative merits. Finally, we address the question of how TFP growth is related to standard measures of individual banks’ financial performance such as return on equity.

This study adds to knowledge by providing explicit comparisons of bank TFP growth in these two giant emerging markets. It brings more recent data into play: one advantage of looking at the period 2000-7 is that most major bank reforms have had a chance to “bed down” by this time. It is the first banking study outside the OECD area to compare and contrast the DEA and SFA approaches. It also adds to the literature by assessing the empirical relationship between TFP change and share prices.

The main findings are first, that TFP growth is largely driven by technical progress/innovation. It is somewhat faster in China than in India and strongest in large banks, though in China, there may be some deceleration with a shift in the underlying components. Second, the influence of ownership varies between the countries and listing is similarly ambiguous. Foreign banks display slower growth than locally owned banks in both countries. Third, for India, the period covering the early 2000s is found to be broadly in line with the aggregate TFP growth findings of most studies that covered the 1990s. Fourth, the Divisia (using SFA) and Malmquist (using DEA) TFP changes are not notably different in aggregate, but often generate pronounced differences in estimates of different components that drive TFP growth. Fifth, TFP advances are found to exert important influences on bank-specific equity prices.

JEL classification: G21, G28, D24
Keywords
: productivity change, China, India, stochastic frontier; data envelopment analyses

Read more about the whole paper after its publication; we will get back to this issue.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Xiaoqing (Maggie) Fu
Associate Professor of Finance, Interim Associate Dean of Graduate School, Faculty of Business Administration, University of Macau

 

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