China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

China and the U.S. election

November 3, 2020

During my many visits to China I used to get the impression that the Chinese mostly looked at the U.S. with mixed feelings – feelings that also included some kind of admiration. The American dream of developing from a poor origin to a wealthy person attracted many Chinese on micro levels. Some kind of capitalist socialism or vice versa was born in the 1990s.

Politically, China and the U.S. kept quite some distance in the new millennium all the same. Tensions continued during Bill Clinton’s presidency but his support for China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 was appreciated. This move turned out to be the main driver for China’s rise to become the largest economy in the world (in terms of total GDP and PPP), together with the simultaneously ongoing globalization. President Obama’s relations to China had a number of ups and downs as well. President Trump, finally, could be increasingly regarded as an opponent to China during the past four years.

In 1997, professor David Shambaugh wrote in Current History (September) that “China and the United States are likely to be the dominant world powers in the twenty-first century. It is imperative that these two continental giants learn to live and work together productively and cooperatively”. Altogether, the conclusion above on the two leading world powers turned out to be right – but the recommendation of working together did not really come true, particularly not in the past four years. Biden could make some difference – but probably not in a significant manner.

The Trump years of 2017-2021 – and now?

President Trumps leitmotiv of “America first” did quite some harm to China, the global economy and also to the U.S. itself, particularly due to the revival of protectionism. This is certainly a bad development. But what do the Chinese themselves feel about today’s election?

Despite many unfriendly words from the Trump-administration, the Chinese support Trump’s aversion or doubts against traditional allies such as NATO and his attempt to weaken American (Western) democracy. Chinese media also take the chance of describing the superiority of its authoritarian system, exemplified by what the official China calls the victory against the covid-19 crisis. China remains the top issue for the Chinese and certainly not the U.S. The result of the presidential election in the U.S. does not make a major difference – neither to President Xi Jinping or the Chinese people (according to my own understanding of Chinese press). However, there is no clearly visible preference for Biden either.

Competition with the U.S. will remain the keyword for the future of China – when it comes to the economy, technology, research and military power. However, in my view three possible and necessary changes may happen in the future with a President Biden: a (somewhat) stronger priority of  the environment, a (somewhat) better political predictability and a more polite style of communication between the two superpowers.

And we should not give up hope for better cooperation!

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

Back to Start Page

Giving Asia Its Due in Global Financial Regulation *

January 10, 2017

With US inward turn, China should get a bigger role to bolster system

Global cooperation on financial regulation has become increasingly important and valuable over the last decade, but its effectiveness cannot be taken for granted. Following November’s U.S. presidential election, Asia, and particularly China, needs to take a more central role to ensure the viability of the global system.

Compared with other modes of international economic cooperation, the global financial regulatory system is in a nascent stage of development. It is made up of a network of diverse organizations and groupings, many of them without legally binding authority, with the Financial Stability Board acting as a coordinating hub.

This system has grown in importance, particularly since the global financial crisis, and its impact has been overwhelmingly positive. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, for example, has helped to limit cross-border competitive distortions resulting from incompatible prudential rules and has been increasingly forceful in monitoring national compliance with its agreed standards. The widespread adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation’s accounting principles has greatly enhanced the international comparability of listed companies’ profit statements, even if not yet on a universal basis. The Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation has opened the way toward universal interoperable financial data formats by issuing codes to transaction participants that function in a way comparable to the internet protocol addresses that underlie the World Wide Web.

Such arrangements are even more valuable as the global financial system becomes increasingly multipolar and interconnected, enhancing the need for joint work by public financial authorities on a commonly agreed basis.

Aside from the above organizations, key participants in the regulatory system include treaty-based organizations such as the Bank for International Settlements, which hosts the Financial Stability Board, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and its Financial Action Task Force. These are complemented by independent groups such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators. The roots of the treaty-based institutions can be traced to the second quarter of the 20th century, but none of the other entities in this global network are more than 45 years old.

The global financial regulatory system has long been lopsided and in need of change as the emergence of new financial powerhouses, particularly in Asia, has challenged the dominance of North American and European states.

Significant improvement has flowed from the 2008 shift to tackling financial and economic issues at Group of 20 leaders’ summits from Group of Seven nation summits. The membership ranks of the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board, for example, have been expanded to include major emerging economies and financial centers.

But blatant imbalances remain. On a recent count, all but one of the 27 most senior leadership positions in this system were held by nationals from North Atlantic countries. Almost all entities in the network are similarly headquartered in the North Atlantic region, the only exception being the soon-to-be-established permanent secretariat of the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators in Tokyo.

Challenges ahead

The system’s institutional fragility is about to be tested by the incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. His “America first” stance will surely create multiple challenges for all international cooperation frameworks, and financial regulation will be no exception.

The response to this test should include an accelerated rebalancing and reform of the global regulatory system to ensure its viability in the new environment. Asia, and specifically China, should claim a much more central position in the system than is currently the case and other nations should facilitate this evolution.

Specifically, China should propose highly qualified officials, of which it has an increasing number, for positions of leadership in global financial regulatory bodies and engage more proactively in their various workstreams. As with action against climate change, and given Europe’s current internal difficulties, China is fast becoming the indispensable anchor for sustainable joint efforts at the global level and should invest accordingly in its representation in global discussions.

In this context, Europe should streamline its presence in the system, as a logical consequence of its own ongoing reform and thus leave room for greater Asian and Chinese leadership. Specifically, Europe’s banking union implies that the representation of individual euro-area countries in bodies in charge of financial stability has become anachronistic and should be replaced by euro-area or EU-level participation. The Basel Committee is a case in point. Now that banking supervisory policy has been comprehensively pooled within the euro area, the separate membership of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain should be phased out.

The relevant bodies should then demonstrate their continued relevance by further improving the system’s effectiveness, even if the new U.S. administration does not initially join some of the resulting initiatives. For example, the Bank for International Settlements, IMF and others should further harmonize formats for financial statistics and data collection. Global regulatory standards should be forcefully developed in new areas in which their need is increasingly evident, such as derivatives. And steps should be considered toward establishing a global level of supervision for limited but critical segments of the financial system, starting with those with no likely fiscal or quasi-fiscal impact in a crisis, such as credit rating agencies or audit firms.

The events of the past decade have amply demonstrated the need for strong global regulatory and supervisory arrangements to keep the inherent risks of cross-border financial integration in check. The prospect of a more unilateralist America should force a rapid realignment in China, other Asian countries and Europe, so that the existing, beneficial financial regulatory system is not left to unravel.

Nicolas Veron
Senior fellow at Bruegel, an economic think tank in Brussels, and a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.



Back to Start Page

————————————————————————————————————————————-

* Both the author and Nikkei Asian Review gave us the permission to re-print the article. Thanks to them. The article was initially published on December 26, 2016.

An interesting impression from HongKong

June 22, 2016

The economic performance of Hong Kong is quite poor these days. The PMI shows that the private sector should do much better. Tourism and retail sales are also badly hit – partly reflecting the slowdown of the mainland economy. Major progress does not seem to be possible in the forthcoming months or quarters.

Most analysts dealing with Asia are probably aware of these problems in Hong Kong. I recently started talking with a businessman from Hong Kong about his city during a flight back to Stockholm, touching upon quite a different topic. He informed me about a development at home which really was striking me.

According to my neighbor on this flight, one third of Hong Kong’s population will be 65 years or older by 2035. This I knew. But I was not aware of the enormous need of apartments for the retired residents who are not sick or disabled – who are indeed healthy. There is obviously a major apartment shortage for these people.

This need urges for creative new business plans, incentives, solutions, practical planning, and partnerships for this major residential construction.  Could Swedish companies participate in these developments?  If yes and they were successful, a lot of the experience from Hong Kong could be applied to Mainland China simultaneously or shortly after the Hong Kong experience. Also to Stockholm?

Despite the current problems in the Chinese economy, we should not forget all the future opportunities in Asia and Greater China. Many of them are still there.

Hubert Fromlet
Senior Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

Back to Start Page