China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

The Art of Reforming Financial Markets – China Still on the Right Track

June 4, 2014

More recently, I have been writing quite a lot about Chinese financial deregulations in articles various articles and also on this blog side – the developments so far and the needs for the future. Special challenges like the issues of timing, sequencing, reforming volumes and speed have been particularly addressed. Mistakes in these areas can be punished very sharply. (More about these challenges in my forthcoming paper “The Chinese Reform Process in a European Perspective” which will be referred to in our Chinaresearch.se blog that will be published in the beginning of August).

So far, nothing directly negative can be said about the already deregulated parts of the Chinese financial markets. The least complicated areas have been or will be approached in the near future – hopefully cautiously and timely. This hope may be justified since China’s political leaders do not like financial experiments. But not all experiments can be avoided in a deregulation process – and certain financial experiments can be more risky than others.

Two weeks ago, the The Bank of Finland’s Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT, with a most inviting front page, interesting references, news and articles) had a short message about the fascinating and opaque topic of Chinese local debt. One could read there: “This week the finance ministry said it would move ahead with a plan to allow ten local administrations issue their own bonds. The ministry is allowing local governments this year to sell bonds with a combined value of up to 400 billion yuan (EUR 47 billion)…”

The is a very desirable reform step – this time on an experimental basis which seems to be appropriate. But five questions should urgently be answered by relevant Chinese decision-makers when details on these ten local bond issues are about to be published :

¤ How are the interest rates for these local bonds to be set?

¤ Who will be allowed to purchase these bond issues?

¤ How will these local bonds be traded?

¤ Where are the rating agencies which can check the Chinese bond market independently?

¤ What about transparency of these local bonds?

Even if China still has not arrived at the more critical cross-border parts of financial deregulation, more attention should be paid to transparency already from now onward. This process should be intensified without reluctance.

 

Hubert Fromlet
Senior Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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Indonesia’s Export Ban for Nickel Pig Iron: Negative Impacts on Chinas Stainless Steel Production?

May 7, 2014

In January 2014, the Indonesian government announced an export ban for Nickel Pig Iron (NPI). The government will only allow a quota of twenty percent of the former export volumes of untreated NPI and will hold the rest of the NPI ore in the country. The main reason is to increase the added-value from Indonesia’s high nickel ore resources.

Today between 500,000 to 550,000 tons of nickel – around a quarter of the global refinery production – are produced in China on the basis of mainly Indonesian NPI. China has become the biggest nickel producer worldwide. China uses its nickel production primarily as an alloying addition for stainless steel: Stainless steel contains on average of between ten and twelve per cent of nickel. The country is the leading stainless steel producer worldwide with a production volume of 19 million tons and a global market share of 50 percent in 2013.

What are the consequences of the Indonesian export ban for China and the global commodity markets? Firstly, since the beginning of January the nickel prices skyrocketed by more than 3,000 U.S.dollars per ton. Secondly, financial investors came back to the market: Since February 2014, the volume of nickel future contracts rose by a third to around 200,000 contracts at the end of March 2014. Finally, we have to discuss the question whether China will be able to hold the current production level of stainless steel or if other producer countries will become more competitive within the next years.

For 2014, we see no tremendous changes for Chinas stainless steel industry. We estimate China’s reserves for the Nickel Pig Iron production to be between 250,000 and 300,000 tons, which enables China to hold its nickel production on its level of the previous year. The resulting refined nickel production is sufficient for an up to 4 per cent higher stainless steel production in 2014.

But what are the consequences if Indonesia strictly implements the export ban for NPI and other raw materials, e.g. copper ore or tin ore? In this case the Chinese inventories of Nickel Pig Iron will steadily dwindle – beginning in the second half of 2014. The price for conventional nickel ores from other producer countries will increase. The new capacities from mines where nickel ore is a by-product could stabilize the nickel demand for the next two years. The oversupply of nickel refinery production over the nickel usage will decrease and we forecast a further price increase for nickel resulting in higher stainless steel prices.

Not later than in the second half of 2016 China’s stainless steel industry could get a problem. Without cheap Indonesian NPI the nickel refinery production as well as the stainless steel production will be less competitive. European and Asian producers outside of China are able to reclaim lost market shares. Nickel prices will fluctuate between 25,000 and 30,000 US-Dollars per metric ton.

In our view, the possibility that Indonesia will enforce the export ban very strictly is below twenty per cent for the next two years. After the depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah the country needs the revenues of its raw material exports. Therefore we only expect a reduction of the volume of NPI exports and other raw materials in the short term. Today, one of the main reasons is that Indonesia has not sufficient domestic capacities to refine the NPI completely in the country. But for the medium-term and in the long-term Indonesia will build up new capacities either alone or together with some foreign investors.

This could result in changes in the competitive landscape in the stainless steel industry.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dr. Heinz-Jürgen Büchner
Managing Director Industrials / Automotive, IKB Deutsche Industriebank

 

 

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Africa – a continent of future “growth lions” ?

Africa – a continent of future “growth lions” ?

Some minutes ago, I listened to Toto’s wonderful song “Africafrom the early 1980s. Good music and jogging often lead to new ideas. So why not changing the topic of my blog contribution a little bit and writing some lines on the economically and politically lagging – but wonderful and kind – continent of Africa?

Sure, I have visited Sub-Saharan African countries to a much lesser extent than all the Asian “growth tigers”. But I read also all over the years all the discouraging reports on Africa and – more or less – most individual Sub-Saharan countries. Just a few countries proved to be a little bit more future-oriented than all the others since the 1980s. In quite a number of countries, economic conditions have even worsened considerably in the past decades. The rest of the Sub-Saharan countries remained more or less unchanged on low economic and social levels, at least during the past decade.

Now – finally – Africa is increasingly “in” – particularly in the eyes of many politicians and analysts/strategists in our part of the world. Positive messages are spread all over the world, more lately also by the Swedish minister of finance. Africa is more and more praised as the continent of the future.

I really do hope that these conclusions turn out to be right. Looking at the African country-wise GDP-growth for the past decade, however, does not reveal any major acceleration of growth rates. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), GDP-growth rates have been more and more less unchanged during the past decade, something like stable 5 ½ percent on average (Morocco, Tunisia and Libya included) – without major volatility. Also on country levels, growths fluctuations were quite limited in the past ten years. Positive outliers are, for instance, Ghana, Togo and Zambia, whereas South Africa, Sudan and Uganda are characterized by a weakening growth trend.

Some of the Sub-Saharan African countries have achieved structural improvements in the past 10-15 years or so. What may be even more important is the fact that also foreign investment interests in Africa has been growing. However, there are still only six Sub-Saharan countries among the leading 100 countries when it comes to the World Bank’s/IFC’s ranking of business conditions out of totally 189 countries (Mauritius on number 20, Rwanda [!] 32, South Africa 41 (only!), Botswana 56, Ghana 67, Zambia 83, Namibia 98 – and 20 countries are among the last 25 countries on the list of “Doing Business 2013”).

All in all, things have been moving (somewhat) in the right direction all the same. However, by far too many African countries south of the Sahara still have not created satisfactory political and institutional conditions for a sustainable upward trend. Modern definitions of institutions are quite broad and include also traditions and habits, both the good ones and the bad ones. The bad habits and traditions include even factors like corruption, lagging application of existing laws and insufficient statistics. Badly working institutions may exist within the political, social and financial sector, government administration, property rights, etc. Both researchers and practitioners know that it usually takes a long time to change institutional shortcomings to the better. This includes also health care, the environment, more broadly anchored education, etc.

It is, of course, positive that the economies in a number of Sub-Saharan countries probably have entered a more positive – or less negative – stage of their economic development. In certain cases political progress can be noted as well. But these specific cases do not allow putting all Sub-Saharan African countries in the same promising basket. Africa has to be analyzed country by country and case by case – and not so much by using general conclusions that unify developments to the “African economy”. Similar – misguiding – aggregated views were already created after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain by summarizing all the reforming countries to “Eastern Europe” – and not to forget the BRICS countries which nowadays definitely do not manifest themselves as a homogenous group of countries.

In many ways, impressing developments in China are often taken as an argument against the quite common view that institutions mean a lot to economic growth – as, for example, institutional economists like Douglass North, Dani Rodrik and Daron Acemoglu so strongly are pleading for in their research. In other words: Opponents to the strong supporters of institutional economics normally use China’s on average poor institutional standards and its simultaneously good economic growth as the most prominent example for their skeptical position (result from our very recent China Survey Panel for Chinese institutions on a scale from 1-10: 4.1 , 10=very good).

On the other hand, we have noticed more recently that also China must do much more for a sustainable future good GDP growth than in the past (which is reflected in the official documents from the Third Plenum last November). There is no doubt that also China has to improve its institutional standards substantially in the next five to ten years for not be being caught in the so-called middle-income trap.

Thus, the main conclusion of this article is that Africa south of the Sahara should not be analyzed in the aggregated way as it’s mostly done these days. Analysis and investments there should be made country by country – even if the currently more positive mood for the continent may help. Hopefully, China can manage its growth problems smoothly – also because of most African countries´ dependence on commodity prices (where Chinese demand usually is the main price driver). But more value-added production should be created in Africa, too. Hopefully, trends in the world economy are moving to a new kind of equilibrium that favors the whole global economy, Africa included.

Right now, there is at least a starting point for more hope, supported by a better psychological mood on Africa outside the one-billion people continent. GDP growth around 5-5 ½ percent means that at least the younger lions have entered the global economic growth scene – like the young Asian tigers did young some 25-35 years ago. However, we have to understand that lions and tigers are very different – like the fundamentals for the Asian and African economies. But this should not refrain from hoping for Africa’s best while the young lions are growing up! They will have a long way to go …

 

Hubert Fromlet
Visiting Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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