Increasing concerns about China
August 25, 2026
Western view on China remains divided. Many analysts linked to macroeconomics and to financial stability remain worried or skeptical about the state of the Chinese economy. Corporate leaders in many industrial countries outside China feel on the other hand mostly scared about Chinese progress in certain high-tech segments and discuss scarcely the macroeconomic and financial problems of the country.
The absence of good economic news during summer
Without elaborating further all shortcomings of Chinese statistical quality, not even official Chinese statistics showed encouraging macroeconomic signals. Let’s give some disappointing examples that came in more lately:
– GDP rose in Q2 by only 4.3 percent yoy, below the official objective of 4.5-5 percent for this year and below market expectations. One cannot rule out that this number in reality may have been even weaker. It may be added that 4.3 percent was the lowest annual GDP increase since Q4 in 2022.
– Retail sales increased in July by just 0.6 percent yoy, down from 1 percent in June and below market expectations as well. Very weak car sales (-17 percent) contributed strongly to this disappointing number. Building materials, furniture and petroleum products fell also considerably in the same month.
– Fixed asset investment decreased by 6.7 percent yoy during the January–July period, worsening further compared to accumulated 5.7 percent in the first half of 2026. This number confirms the sluggish activity trend in the Chinese economy, particularly in the property sector.
– Foreign Direct Investment fell in value terms to 6,2 percent in July (June -5 percent) after having been in negative territory since June 2023, reflecting (somewhat?) declining foreign interest in the Chinese market and increasing uncertainty about Chinese growth prospects.
– The RatingDog China PMI – previously known as the Caixin PMI and put together by S&P – weakened for manufacturing to 50,9 in July and to 50,4 for services in the same month. Thus, PMI for manufacturing has been moving down since April this year. PMI for services reached in July the lowest level since September 2024.
The only important positive statistical exception could be noted for (gross) exports which in July expanded strongly yoy in USD terms by 23,9 percent, to a high extent due to high global demand for high-tech components; the AI boom and the demand for electric vehicles continued to favor Chinese exports substantially. Anticipated shipments to the U.S. for tackling potentially new American tariffs could have been another explanation for the surging Chinese exports. China’s unsatisfactory domestic growth performance may have meant some extra political push to Chinese export efforts, too.
However, imports grew by as much as 27.5 percent last month but still leading to a trade surplus of 112 billion USD in July. This is 15 billion USD more than one year earlier – a development that may induce intensified trade frictions and also tougher trade negotiations by the U.S. and the EU with China this coming fall.
The unknown dimensions of fiscal and financial imbalances
It cannot be questioned that weakening or declining economic growth has a negative impact on China’s fiscal and financial stability. Certain concerns about this issue have been expressed in Western media more recently but without illumnating details. These shortcomings can mainly be related to insufficient Chinese transparency both when it comes to the rapidly increasing central/local government debt (https://tradingeconomics.com/china/government-debt-to-gdp) and the real state of all the insecure or bad loans of the financial system. More exact dimensions of these two – partly interlinked – issues remain therefore unknown but should cause worries, at least in the medium or the longer run.
A conundrum are also the potential volumes of future politically based growth support. Fiscal constraints are certainly considered by the political leadership -but also the urgent need of certain growth-supporting measures. I would guess that China’s political leaders prefer to go for quite cautious fiscal stimuli instead of really expansionary budgetary action. But who knows?
Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University