China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

SCO – another example of Chinese long-term strategy

September 3, 2025

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) belongs to the international conventions that are hardly known in our part of the world. Though having been founded already in 2001, not very much has been reported from the 24 Heads of State Council meetings before the 25th SCO convention that took place recently in Tinjian.  The SCO Tianjin Summit 2025 has probably been the most important of its kind so far, due to the list of prominent participants and the burning international conflicts.

Long-term aspects more important than short-term results

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), is an intergovernmental organization that has been started in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan aiming at peace and cooperation among its member states with the intention to promote what then was called a new fair political and economic order. Later on, also India, Pakistan and Iran joined the organization.

Totally, the SCO also includes quite a number of observer states from the Eurasian region. Around half of the global population is represented in the SCO which considers itself as an alternative to corresponding Western organizations .

According to the SCO, its main goals are defined as follows:

#  “to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good-neighborliness between the Member States;

#  to encourage the effective cooperation between the Member States in such spheres as politics, trade, economy, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transport, tourism, environmental protection, etc;

#  to jointly ensure and maintain peace, security and stability in the region; and

# to promote a new democratic, fair and rational international political and economic international order”.

When reading these points above, one can easily observe their general and unbinding character – whatever this may mean. But now more co-operation among the member countries seems to be strived. This would allow China – the strongest member of the SCO – to pave the way for the continued development of the SCO (see https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/618965), certainly in line with its international long-term strategy. A parallel long-term strategy of this kind is also visible in other parts of the globe, for example in Africa, South America and the Pacific area. Russia’s role in the SCO seems to remain limited compared to China’s dominant position. India’s future impact on the SCO still appears unclear but closer relations to China seem to be on the cards. Trump’s tariffs could favor such a development even more than so far.    

Conclusion: China’s interest in the future of the SCO underlines again its long-term ambitions in the world – for reasons of political influence, new markets for its exports and the future supply with important commodities. By looking somewhat deeper into the SCO, we have got another example of China’s unique capacity to apply both short-term and long-term perspectives at the same time. A phenomenon that uses to come back regularly and that often is neglected in Western countries and companies..

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University

President Trump’s trade policy – bad news for lagging (emerging) countries

April 25, 2025

The whole world has learned in the past few weeks that American President Donald Trump does not understand cross-border trade policy – or does not want to understand it. More or less all experts inside and outside the U.S. have accused him of neglecting the most obvious advantage of free trade and the disadvantages of protectionism and raising tariffs on such a broad global scale.
What should be discussed more in our part of the world are the bad consequences that affect many of the emerging and less developed countries by all the single bilateral trade accords the U.S. wants to achieve, primarily with strategically important trading partners such as India and possibly also China.

Bilateral trade deals have a lot of disadvantages
We know from reality that there exist both bilateral and multilateral trade agreements which should not be equalized with more ambitious pure free trade agreements. Let’s begin by discussing somewhat what bilateral trade agreements are about – the kind of trade agreement that President Trump and his administration clearly prefer. This was – by the way – obvious already in February 2017 (https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-will-trumps-embrace-of-bilateralism-mean-for-americas-trade-partners/).

We know that it is not difficult to recognize that a bilateral trade agreement practically uses to be easier and faster to achieve than a multilateral one. The main reason for this is that bilateral negotiations only have two sides, in our already mentioned case, for example, the U.S. and India. Multilateral trade negotiations with several or many involved countries on the other hand can take years or even decades. However, multilateral trade agreements can create a larger harmonized market than bilateral trade agreements, provide connected countries with more competition and innovative power plus, consequently, lower prices. They can also help to resolve trade disputes via the currently disarmed WTO and promote cooperation and stability among countries.

In my view, the time-limited duration of bilateral trade negotiations compared to multilateral trade talks manifests itself as the major advantage that this option of trade negotiation usually enjoys. Otherwise, quite a number of disadvantages can be found.
Among the countries that initially are particularly affected by Trump’s tariffs are, for example, China, Lesotho, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Syria, Botswana, Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia, Angola, South Africa, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, etc (see https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-reciprocal-tariffs-liberation-day-list/).
Many other emerging and less advanced countries could be quoted as well, spread all over the globe – countries that are strongly hit by the irresponsible Trump tariffs. Consequently, it cannot be regarded as a surprise that that more than 50 affected countries already a few days after the so-called “Liberation day” on April 2 had announced – according to Trump advisers – that they wanted to negotiate over the import taxes they have been confronted with (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-advisers-say-more-than-50-countries-have-reached-out-for-tariff-talks-with-white-house). Other sources speak currently about stronger interest from even more countries (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-tariff-trade-deal-countries-b2737526.html). We know that it will be bilateral negotiations accordingly.

Bilateral trade negotiations for so many countries mean by definition that different results will come out for the participating countries – leading to further injustice between suffering countries. Different results are logical because of the fact that bilateral trade negotiations have no underlying support by the WTO. This means also that more and more bilateral trade agreements tend to hollow out the position of the WTO – very much at the expense of outsiders among emerging and less developed countries. From this point of view, multilateral agreements are more beneficial to developing countries than bilateral ones because the included countries become more competitive as a group.
In general terms, larger corporations are supposed to benefit the most from bilateral trade agreements because they usually have bigger resources for different competition-improving activities than smaller and medium-sized companies.

Conclusion – disparities may increase, also geographically
Altogether, analysts should be cautious about positive trade interpretations after the ongoing or forthcoming bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and a significant number of emerging and less developed countries, particularly since the results may differ substantially between non-OECD countries both in trade details and geographically. It should be a good idea to look deeper into the negotiated trade deals between the U.S. and the tariff-affected countries – and what they really mean to them.

Hubert Fromlet
Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University

Afrika i ett stormaktsperspektiv

September 18, 2024

Superpower activities in Africa 

Recently, I published an article in Swedish on African challenges as a reaction on some articles in the Swedish academic journal Ekonomisk Debatt in its April number from 2024 (https://www.nationalekonomi.se/artikel/afrikas-handel-utmaningar-och-mojligheter/). Several authors put then a strong emphasis on all the increasing commercial opportunities that may be derived from the relatively new free trade agreement African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Sure, everybody should be happy about a hopefully improving trade future for Africa. However, African progress cannot be based on improved trade conditions alone. Better working institutions are – more or less – needed in all African countries which in any emerging market uses to be a long journey. But, better starting now than waiting another five or ten years. 

Unfortunately, the EU and the U.S. have neglected the important continent of Africa in many respects for too long time, more lately even in the fight against covid and other diseases – but also when it comes to fruitful and friendly cooperation in the strategic fields of commodities, infrastructure and education. 

Instead, China and Russia have recognized this Western neglect and strengthened more lately their positions considerably in quite a number of Sub-Saharan countries. 

More about this in my above-mentioned article with the following link https://www.nationalekonomi.se/artikel/stor-geopolitik-afrikas-utveckling/.

Hubert Fromlet Affiliate Professor at the School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board