China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

Our ”temperature indicator” for China rises slightly to 6.2 – but the growth outlook remains moderate

January 8, 2014

Summary
¤ Our so-called “temperature indicator” for the Chinese economy improved somewhat to 6.2 in December 2013 compared to 5.4 in June 2013 (10=extremely overheated). This is number that indicates quite modest growth by Chinese standards. Around 20 China experts from Asia, North America and Europe participated in this survey.

¤ The panel’s GDP projections (average, in brackets the forecasts from June 2013):
2013: 7.6 (7.6); 2013q4 7.8 (7.8); 2014: 7.6 (7.5); 2014 q4: 7.2 (7.3).
China has obviously landed on more dampened growth path.

¤ 78% of the panelists think that the currency renminbi will appreciate slightly during 2014 (1-5%).

¤ 75% of the panelists still see a kind of bubble on the real estate market.

¤ The panel’s confidence in the economic future of China is quite neutral (around 3 in a five year’s perspective on a scale from 1-5; 5=very strong) – but surprisingly somewhat above 3 (i.e. 3.5) in a ten years’ view. The latter result shows implicitly that there is some confidence that China’s reform policy during the current leadership will at least be partly successful.

¤ The three most strongly preferred reform areas seem to be – according to the panel (ranked):
financial markets, the hokou system (for registration), and, side by side: corruption and the environment.

 

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Hubert Fromlet
Visiting Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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“Abenomics: The Delusion of a Backward-Looking Mind”

December 4, 2013

Japan has a problem. The problem is called “Abenomics”. “Abenomics” is actually not “Abenomics”. It is “Ahonomics”. “Aho” is a Japanese word meaning “silly”, “stupid”, “idiotic” and so forth. You get the general idea. I have been trying to make the word “Ahonomics” catch on ever since I thought of it. Indeed I have succeeded to some extent since the word made it onto the short list for “The Word of the Year” award which is given out by a well-known publisher in Japan at each year-end.

“Abenomics” is “Ahonomics” for a variety of reasons. Let me focus on just one for this piece. It is targeted at the wrong problem. And it is applying wrong and dangerous tactics to solve this wrong problem.

The Abe government thinks that what the Japanese economy lacks is growth. This is wrong. For one thing the Japanese economy has actually been growing albeit very modestly for much of the past decade. Moreover, it is already a very large economy. It is also a mature economy with more than enough socio-economic infrastructure to keep it functioning smoothly. It is also a very rich economy. It really does not need to keep on growing faster to make ends meet.

Yet for all these accomplishments it is not a perfect economy. Far from it. It has one very pointed issue that needs to be addressed. This is the issue of what I would like to call poverty in affluence. Japan is immersed in all this affluence. Yet in the midst of it, we have growing numbers of people who are the working poor. Who suffer harsh working conditions. Who live highly precariously under short-term labour contracts whose terms are apt to infringe on codes of human rights protection. Recent figures have it that 16% of the working population in Japan lives below the poverty line. The countries with the lowest rate of poverty are Denmark and Sweden both with only 5.3% of the working population falling below the poverty line. Their low rates of poverty do them much credit. By comparison, for the Japanese economy with its maturity and affluence to have a poverty ratio that is three times as large as those of the Nordic nations is a very strange state of affairs.

Not only is this strange. It is scandalous. Not only is this strange and scandalous, it is also bad for the economy. Mr. Abe claims he wants to get rid of deflation in Japan. He will never accomplish this if he does not pay attention to this issue of poverty. With this many people living in poverty there is no way that Japan could ever get out of the deflationary cycle.

So how do you go about resolving this problem. The obvious answer is redistribution. Japan’s affluence is not being distributed properly. There is too much concentration of wealth. Japan’s rising Gini index indicates this. Policies need to be put in place which can redistribute the overall wealth in our hands in a more equitable fashion.

There are two very immediate ways in which this redistribution can be achieved. One is to raise wages. The other is to raise interest rates. Wage increases speak for themselves. People need to be paid more if they are to spend more. For the sake of fairness it has to be said that the Abe government has been working on this. But only through cajoling and bullying companies to raise headline wage rates. This would only drive companies to resort more extensively on short-term low paid labour.

For interest rates to start earning some money for ordinary small investors is also important. People’s deposits should reap soe interest for them. But this is not going to happen under a monetary regime which sticks with zero interest rates. Yet Japan’s monetary policy will never be able to stop the quantitative easing and the zero interest rates that go with it. This is because this great monetary easing is the only thing that is standing between the Japanese government and bankruptcy. Team Abe at the Bank of Japan has gone out of its way to turn the BOJ from a central bank into a spcialised money lender for the Japanese government. The BOJ might as well stop calling itself a central bank since propping up the government is all that they seem interested in these days.

Yet another name I have for “Abenomics” is “Dopingnomics”. It is an attempt to inject all kinds of questionable substances into the Japanese body economic so that it can start running at top speed again on the strength of very artificially pumped up muscles.

One wonders what all this is really in aid of. The suspicion deepens that it is all about “Fukoku-Kyohei”. “Fukoku” means a rich country. “Kyohei” means a strong military. Is there a hidden agenda here of building up a nation that can go to war again ? Indeed this agenda seems to become less hidden and more apparent by the day as Mr. Abe bulldozes his official secrets act through parliament.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Noriko Hama
Professor & Dean at Doshisha Business School, Kyoto

 

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Once More: Analyzing the (Chinese) PMI

The Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) serves as a well-known and quite reliable short-term indicator in an increasing number of countries. When I introduced the PMI for Sweden at Swedbank together with SILF in the year 1994, this indicator had its history only in the United States. Neutral analysts consider the quality of the Swedish PMI as fairly good, too, particularly since we then did not rush into this new indicator for “marketing reasons”. Our tests and seasonal adjustments took quite some time. In a number of other countries, the PMI preparations took considerably less time until publication. Whether the increased speed of preparation has been affecting the quality of the PMI in different countries more negatively, I am not really sure about. Nowadays, the PMI can be found all over the world, China included.

I had some comments on the two Chinese PMIs in a previous blog (from June 7, 2013). Today, I would like to make some further comments and repeat some of my previous ones (which to a high can be applied generally as well).

First, analysts and media should handle smaller monthly changes of the PMI more carefully – particularly when the PMI moves upward but still relatively closely to the 50-index level, i.e. around 51-53. An improvement from 51.4 to 52.0 does not mean a lot of a change.

Second, the PMI is a so-called diffusion index. This means that the monthly changes of the PMI – particularly when the changes are more limited – do not really express the strength of the individual changes in the index. In other words: analysts should not only focus on the direction of the PMI but also on the level. This is not always the case. The experience from Sweden is that more positive times and improvements of the business situation tend to show up more clearly when the PMI starts exceeding levels around 55. This thumb rule may, however, vary from country to country.

Third, less monthly random can be achieved when also 3-months moving averages are added to the usual graph or numbers. Thus, a limited trend interpretation is made possible.

Fourth, when it comes to China we really do not have any idea about the composition and representativeness of the selected “PMI companies “(which users of the PMIs in our part of the world do not either; but statistics in the Western part of the globe tend to have – with certain exceptions – higher statistical standards compared to statistical quality in China).

Fifth, the PMI could be the best Chinese short-term indicator all the same. When longer time series will be available, this thinkable record will be very interesting to analyze more thoroughly. And the other point to summarize is that small moves of the PMI – up or down – should not be interpreted too exactly. However, the PMI remains an interesting, fresh and quickly calculated economic indicator in many countries. Hopefully in China, too!

Hubert Fromlet
Visiting Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

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