China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

India: the Economic Outlook in the Near to Medium Term

June 5, 2012

The international economic climate is of course not good. The problems of the Eurozone are festering and as long as they remain like that, there will always be a sense that some kind of bad event may pop up around the corner. However, given the amount of liquidity that has been pumped in by the ECB a crisis of the 2008 is unlikely. India, as also other developing countries are negatively impacted on account of the European problems in three ways. First their export markets are diminished, second global financing for projects is harder to obtain and finally both domestic and overseas investor confidence is affected adversely. Of course, this general malaise is tempered by the situation of individual developing economies and the actions that they individually take on various fronts.

About India, there is a surfeit of concern about the economic outlook – some real, others imaginary. Over the past few years, self-flagellation has seemingly become high fashion in the media and other forum of discourse. Being modest about one’s achievements is both prudent and in good taste; as indeed is being contrite about one’s failures. However, self-mortification without end is a waste of time and a waste of opportunity. Since the elite are well provided, the foregone opportunities will inevitably be at the expense of the not elite.

Over the past few years, three categories of real problems have reared up. The first from a build-up of macro-economic tension: They include inadequate recovery in the momentum of private investment in infrastructure after the global crisis of 2008–2009, compounded by a fiscal position under stress. Domestic inflation has also been much above comfort levels. These factors generate negative feedback to business confidence. The second category includes a variety of problems in the operational or executive domain. Some of them have been resolved in the last one year and others are in various stages of being resolved. The third is in the sphere of politics, where developments in the past few years have made decision-making harder.

On the macro-economic front, fixed investment rates had risen in the past eight years largely because of a big increase in corporate investment. However, private investment in infrastructure and industry remain subdued. In the fiscal year (FY) ending March 2005 private corporate fixed investment was 9% of GDP, which rose steadily to over 14% in FY2008, just before the global crisis. This resulted in the fixed investment rate peaking at nearly 33% of GDP in that year. Thereafter private corporate fixed investment slipped to 10% of GDP in the subsequent four years and overall fixed investment is down to little over 29% in FY2012. It is not that a fixed investment rate of 29–30% is something to mock at, since it can give us 7.5–8.0% overall growth. But the fixed investment ratio has been and could again be about 3–4 percentage points of GDP higher than it is. It would give the necessary lift to all-round activity, expand supply, reduce inflationary pressures and make the fiscal consolidation process easier.

Both inflation and fiscal deficits are well over the comfort level. Pessimism has coloured the atmosphere. One consequence has been the huge increase in household investment allocation to gold. Knock out gold import and it can be seen that the real merchandise trade deficit as a proportion of GDP has not worsened as much as the total. The ratio (excluding gold) was (–) 5% in both FY2006 and touched a high of (–) 7.8% in FY2009. It fell off thereafter and in FY2012 is estimated to be 6.5% of GDP. Thus on the trade front, despite very high crude oil prices, there has not been that much worsening in the trade deficit as is widely believed. That is for normal goods and services. That is, excluding gold the demand for which behaves like an asset, not like a commodity. The corollary is that if we can fix the problem by making it more attractive for Indian households to hold their savings in financial instruments we should be able to significantly reduce our current account deficit from the present very high levels of 3.5–4.0% of GDP.

Then again if we can contain the current account deficit to more manageable proportions and if we take the other necessary measures to improve the state of our economy, capital inflows will be higher and ipso facto financing that current account deficit will be fairly easy.

What we can do internally is to first work towards securing better co-ordination within the governmental system so that investors feel that risks emanating from this source are mitigated. We have had a measure of success here – especially in the coal, electricity and port sectors. Government executive decision making impacts the infrastructure space – energy, roads, railways and ports – the most powerfully and that has been our initial focus. India suffers from a want of the infrastructure that developed nations take for granted. The productivity of our people can only increase through a combination of the building of such assets on the one hand and improved education & the acquisition of skills on the other.

Projects where governmental action can have a proportionately larger impact and which then can positively impact other areas of the economy are being sought to be fast tracked. In the past five years, compared to earlier years, we have been able to build multiples of power generating & transmission capacity, multiples of roads – both highways and rural – greatly improve farm incomes and other livelihood opportunities. We seek to continue to pursue these ends energetically.

There are important issues, such as petroleum product subsidies, that have got caught up in politics and which have a large and material impact on government finance and hence on the economy at large. We have to gain some traction on these issues and one hopes that some of this will indeed transpire, perhaps at least partially, over the next few months.

 

 

 

 

Saumitra Chaudhuri
Member, Planning Commission & Member Advisory Council to the Prime Minister and the Government of India

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Our Overheating Indicator Falls to 4.9

Summary

  • Our so-called overheating indicator for China (right now rather a temperature indicator) fell in May 2012 to 4.9 from 5.9 in December 2011 (10=extremely overheated).
    Around 20 China experts from Asia, North America and Europe participated once again in the survey.
  • GDP forecasts by the China panel (average,%): 2012: 7.3, 2012 q4: 7.4, 2013: 8.3 %.
    The short-term outlook for 2012 is more modest than previously predicted – but still not too worrisome.
    The new forecast for 2013 is roughly unchanged compared to the last one.
  • 90 % of the panelists predict that the currency renminbi (RMB) in 2012 will be stable or appreciate by just 1-5 percent.
  • 82 % of the panelists think that there is still a dangerous price bubble on the real estate market (Dec 2011: 92 %).
  • The panel’s grading of confidence in the Chinese economy looks as follows:
    (5=very high confidence; 1=very low confidence)
    3 years from now: 3.5 5 years from now: 3.0 10 years from now: 2.8
  • The majority of LNU’s China panelists predicts that it will take up to 5-10 years to recognize a clearly visible shift to a more consumption-oriented growth model. It is not a short-term issue.

Read the full China Panel No 14, 2012 report

 

Hubert Fromlet
Professor of International Economics
Editorial board

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The Prime Minister’s Feeler

May 2, 2012

The recently made comment by the Chinese Prime Minister We Jiabao on an opening of the banking sector is not easy to judge. He gave his opinion on this issue briefly after this year’s National People’s Congress in a radio interview. The comments were made by a Prime Minister on leave whose probable successor LiKeqiang is about to become increasingly visible. Thus, we don’t know whether Wen has a majority for his ideas. Cautiousness in its interpretation seems to be motivated.

It may be possible that the Prime Minister wanted to collect sympathy points from the population by his critical words. It is, however, worthwhile mentioning that he did not plead for a reform of the banking system because of its inefficiency, its lagging international competitiveness or the major problem of shortages of new credits till small and medium-sized enterprises. Instead, Wen pointed that the Chinese banks make their huge profits too easily – a comment that certainly receives a lot of appreciation in the population. And Wen singled out the openness of his comments, which implicitly means that others are less frank.

The timing for Wen’s comments was obviously well chosen, i.e. shortly after the annual reports of three major Chinese banks, which actually announced that they had increased their profits in 2011 by 25 to 28 percent. This means for the largest of these three banks – Industrial & Commercial Bank of China – profits around $33 billion, which is really considerable also in a global perspective.

It should be noted that the banking issue is a hot topic in the Chinese political leadership. Wen’s position is the on the progressive side. But the voices of the conservative decision-makers are still in place. They argue that the Chinese banking system, with its four leading large banks, has been functioning well in the past, particularly during the years of the global financial crisis – and also compared too most foreign banks. The monopolistic banking system is regarded as a financial stabilizer and, consequently, working well; current restrictions and prohibitions on leveraged financial products are, consequently, well motivated, according to the conservative opinion on this issue.

The reform-friendly wing of the Communist Party, on the other hand, focuses strongly on the restricted access of SMEs to the credit market – a problem that is to have negative impact even on economic growth. And they add the argument – if the first-mentioned point was rejected – that China is too large and complex for being “ruled” by just a couple of large banks. According to the more market-oriented supporters of changes in the banking landscape, it makes sense to give private banks more commercial opportunities – but still in a cautious way. Thus, this kind of gradual reform approach would also ease the way to further, unavoidable privatization and deregulation steps in the future.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao pointed at the feeler for private bank lending in the city of Wenzhou in South-western China that was announced by the government some days before the interview – a project that could be introduced at other places in China as well, according to Wen. This kind of formulation does not sound like a plan that is more or less ready for implementation.

The following conclusion looks safer: The possible reforms Wen has been talking about will happen without influential Western participation. Western banks will also continuously have to follow what the Chinese dictates for lending volumes and lending rates.

(Chinaresearch.se was kindly allowed to re-publish the author’s article in Handelsblatt from April 5, translated from German into English by LNU).


 

 

 

 

 

 

Frank Sieren
Journalist, author of various books (bestsellers) on China

 

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