China Research

A discussion forum on emerging markets, mainly China – from a macro, micro, institutional and corporate angle.

How Are The Baltic Economies Doing?

June 4, 2014

Following the sharp and deep recessions of the late 2000s when in just two years GDP collapsed by 24% in Latvia and respectively 20% and 16% in Estonia and Lithuania, the Baltic economies soon emerged as the fastest growing in the EU. Early in this decade when growth in Europe hovered just above zero, the Baltics were speeding ahead at (and sometimes above) 4-5% a year. All major imbalances were corrected – fiscal stance improved, large current account deficits erased, company and household balance sheets strengthened. As a sign of sustainability, Estonia was let into the euro area in 2011, Latvia in 2014, and Lithuania is set to do it next year. Lithuanian GDP is not far from the peak of the boom years while Estonia lags by about 4% and Latvia by 8%. GDP per capita and average labour productivity in all three economies are above their boom-time peaks. Unemployment is down from 20% to about 12% in Latvia and Lithuania, and just 8.5% in Estonia. What a recovery!

The latest data is, however, less cheerful. GDP growth has slowed down, though Latvia and Lithuania still pencilled in about 3% YoY in 1Q 2014. Estonia has been doing worse – last year it hovered at just above zero and hit surprisingly weak -1.9% YoY 1Q 2014. What should we expect going forward? The quick answer is that GDP growth this year is likely to remain quite contained at about 3% in Latvia and Lithuania, i.e., some weakening and then gradually gearing up as the growth in European export markets strengthens. As for Estonia, we may see a short-lived recession this year, but growth should come back as exports benefit from a strengthening recovery in Europe and cooling off in the domestic labour market.

Why is growth expected to slow? Some of the reasons are as follows:

First, the post-recession rebound is over. In times of heightened uncertainty, consumption and investment decisions get postponed, recessions often are harsher that the necessary correction and recovery kicks in sharply when the risks of further contraction wane and confidence improves. But it only takes you that far. It is like when you push down on a spring and then let it go – the rebound is sharp, but it runs out.

Second, the Baltic economies are small open economies and their underlying growth model is that of export-driven growth. The populations are shrinking and not yet wealthy enough to drive growth via consumption for long periods without capital inflows from outside. We already saw export to be the major driver in the early stages of the post-recession recovery – with labour costs brought down by slashing wages, reducing employment and raising productivity, exports picked up by double digits year-on-year. This renewed job creation, improved labour market confidence, consumption and thereafter also investment activity. With the lowest hanging fruits of improved productivity and competitiveness already picked, and external demand in major export markets still far from its prime due to still weak European economy, export growth has been lacklustre lately. Labour market has remained strong, and household consumption last year again became the major driver of growth. But one should not be fooled – consumption is strong only as long as labour market feels confident, and it is unlikely to be the case if exports contract or are flat for an extended period. In a cartoon language, consumption is no roadrunner – it cannot run from one side of a canyon to the other. Consumption is a coyote and unless helped by a roadrunner (read – export growth), it will fall down into a canyon (read – contraction in spending). Hence, the success to revive export growth will be a crucial factor for overall economic growth going forward.

Third, the Baltic economies are small open economies with free cross-border labour market mobility and still sizeable income gaps with more advanced EU economies. To reduce the risks of emigration and demographic/social problems going forward, wages need to grow. Falling unemployment rate has been putting an increasing pressure on the wage growth and we see that average real wage growth again exceeds that of average labour productivity. This can put competitiveness and export growth at risk, and we have seen unit labour costs rising, especially in Estonia. Unless productivity growth picks up, labour market will need to cool off to safeguard export competitiveness. Given that productivity gains are difficult to generate and typically are slow to come, this means that consumption growth will need to slow down, especially in Estonia where nominal wage growth so far has been the fastest. With labour market cooling off, wage growth slowing down, and more time to raise productivity, export growth should improve again.

Fourth, the breakout of the Russia-Ukraine conflict will have a negative impact on growth. So far the impact is minor (mostly linked to certain producers of processed food) feeding through the weakness of the rouble, but the conflict is also expected to postpone some of the investment activity. As long as the conflict does not escalate further by leading to energy supply interruptions, much deeper recession in the Russian economy and significant negative spill-overs onto the West European growth, this will have only a slowing effect on the growth in the Baltics, but not push the economies into recession. If there turns out to be recession (e.g., in Estonia this year), it is for other reasons. (For a more detailed analysis on the possible impact from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, see our latest Macro Focus http://www.swedbank-research.com/english/macro_focus/2014/april/index.csp)

Why will the Baltic economies grow? Over the past 15 years growth in the Baltics has seen massive swings on the upside and downside but the overall track record is impressive – GDP per capita (similar data also for average labour productivity) has gone up from ca 36-44% of the EU average to 65-75%. Many of the low hanging fruits have been picked and catch up will become more difficult going forward, but it will not stop. There are many reasons to be optimistic such as closer integration with the EU and continually improving institutions, but one of the major reasons is that populations are still hungry for income growth and better living standards. And so far this has proven to be very important to drive agility of the Baltic economies.

Major negative risks to the outlook: externally it is the weakness of export demand (e.g., due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict), internally it is lack of productivity growth and overheating of the labour market leading to the loss of export competitiveness.

 

Mārtiņš Kazāks

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mārtiņš Kazāks
Swedbank, Deputy Group Chief Economist and Chief Economist in Latvia

 

Back to Start Page

The Art of Reforming Financial Markets – China Still on the Right Track

More recently, I have been writing quite a lot about Chinese financial deregulations in articles various articles and also on this blog side – the developments so far and the needs for the future. Special challenges like the issues of timing, sequencing, reforming volumes and speed have been particularly addressed. Mistakes in these areas can be punished very sharply. (More about these challenges in my forthcoming paper “The Chinese Reform Process in a European Perspective” which will be referred to in our Chinaresearch.se blog that will be published in the beginning of August).

So far, nothing directly negative can be said about the already deregulated parts of the Chinese financial markets. The least complicated areas have been or will be approached in the near future – hopefully cautiously and timely. This hope may be justified since China’s political leaders do not like financial experiments. But not all experiments can be avoided in a deregulation process – and certain financial experiments can be more risky than others.

Two weeks ago, the The Bank of Finland’s Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT, with a most inviting front page, interesting references, news and articles) had a short message about the fascinating and opaque topic of Chinese local debt. One could read there: “This week the finance ministry said it would move ahead with a plan to allow ten local administrations issue their own bonds. The ministry is allowing local governments this year to sell bonds with a combined value of up to 400 billion yuan (EUR 47 billion)…”

The is a very desirable reform step – this time on an experimental basis which seems to be appropriate. But five questions should urgently be answered by relevant Chinese decision-makers when details on these ten local bond issues are about to be published :

¤ How are the interest rates for these local bonds to be set?

¤ Who will be allowed to purchase these bond issues?

¤ How will these local bonds be traded?

¤ Where are the rating agencies which can check the Chinese bond market independently?

¤ What about transparency of these local bonds?

Even if China still has not arrived at the more critical cross-border parts of financial deregulation, more attention should be paid to transparency already from now onward. This process should be intensified without reluctance.

 

Hubert Fromlet
Senior Professor of International Economics, Linnaeus University
Editorial board

 

Back to Start Page

Indonesia’s Export Ban for Nickel Pig Iron: Negative Impacts on Chinas Stainless Steel Production?

May 7, 2014

In January 2014, the Indonesian government announced an export ban for Nickel Pig Iron (NPI). The government will only allow a quota of twenty percent of the former export volumes of untreated NPI and will hold the rest of the NPI ore in the country. The main reason is to increase the added-value from Indonesia’s high nickel ore resources.

Today between 500,000 to 550,000 tons of nickel – around a quarter of the global refinery production – are produced in China on the basis of mainly Indonesian NPI. China has become the biggest nickel producer worldwide. China uses its nickel production primarily as an alloying addition for stainless steel: Stainless steel contains on average of between ten and twelve per cent of nickel. The country is the leading stainless steel producer worldwide with a production volume of 19 million tons and a global market share of 50 percent in 2013.

What are the consequences of the Indonesian export ban for China and the global commodity markets? Firstly, since the beginning of January the nickel prices skyrocketed by more than 3,000 U.S.dollars per ton. Secondly, financial investors came back to the market: Since February 2014, the volume of nickel future contracts rose by a third to around 200,000 contracts at the end of March 2014. Finally, we have to discuss the question whether China will be able to hold the current production level of stainless steel or if other producer countries will become more competitive within the next years.

For 2014, we see no tremendous changes for Chinas stainless steel industry. We estimate China’s reserves for the Nickel Pig Iron production to be between 250,000 and 300,000 tons, which enables China to hold its nickel production on its level of the previous year. The resulting refined nickel production is sufficient for an up to 4 per cent higher stainless steel production in 2014.

But what are the consequences if Indonesia strictly implements the export ban for NPI and other raw materials, e.g. copper ore or tin ore? In this case the Chinese inventories of Nickel Pig Iron will steadily dwindle – beginning in the second half of 2014. The price for conventional nickel ores from other producer countries will increase. The new capacities from mines where nickel ore is a by-product could stabilize the nickel demand for the next two years. The oversupply of nickel refinery production over the nickel usage will decrease and we forecast a further price increase for nickel resulting in higher stainless steel prices.

Not later than in the second half of 2016 China’s stainless steel industry could get a problem. Without cheap Indonesian NPI the nickel refinery production as well as the stainless steel production will be less competitive. European and Asian producers outside of China are able to reclaim lost market shares. Nickel prices will fluctuate between 25,000 and 30,000 US-Dollars per metric ton.

In our view, the possibility that Indonesia will enforce the export ban very strictly is below twenty per cent for the next two years. After the depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah the country needs the revenues of its raw material exports. Therefore we only expect a reduction of the volume of NPI exports and other raw materials in the short term. Today, one of the main reasons is that Indonesia has not sufficient domestic capacities to refine the NPI completely in the country. But for the medium-term and in the long-term Indonesia will build up new capacities either alone or together with some foreign investors.

This could result in changes in the competitive landscape in the stainless steel industry.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dr. Heinz-Jürgen Büchner
Managing Director Industrials / Automotive, IKB Deutsche Industriebank

 

 

Back to Start Page